by Khrushchev and began his attempt to immortalise the
totalitarian system through a series of internal and external cosmetic
changes. It was during this period that the USSR and its allies began to
fall behind their Western opponents in the areas of technology and
economics.
The fifth and final stage was the period of "perestroika" introduced by
Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991) which was eventually to lead to the collapse
of the Eastern European regimes and the USSR itself.
My reason for this periodisation is that from the beginning to the end
of the Soviet system there were two contradictory political trends: one of
which saw totalitarianism as the essence of the utopian communist dream and
a second which aspired to more flexible, economic and political models.
The second trend appeared directly after the February revolution of
1917 in the ideas of local self-government by workers, the implementation of
the NEP by Lenin in 1921 and 1927, the "thaw" of Khrushchev and finally in
the policy of "perestroika" of Mikhail Gorbachov. The essence of this second
trend was the combination of party and political centralism with relatively
greater freedom for the private sector (especially in trade and agriculture)
and in the area of art and culture. Its origin can be seen in the traditions
of European socialism and social democracy.
In the 1920's the proponents of a more flexible and dynamic political
line - N.Bukharin, G.Zinoviev, S.Kamenev, A.Rikov and others lost their
battle for power, allowing the party bureaucracy to dominate all structures
of society. This was the decisive moment for the development of the essence
of the Soviet model. The victory of Stalinism transformed the USSR - and a
number of other countries after the Second World War - into bureaucratic
command societies.
During the period between 1954-1956 when N.Khrushchev was fiercely
critical of the Stalinist era, he found himself in conflict with the
Stalinist system in all sectors of life. As a child of the very same system,
Khrushchev was condemning not the system but the style and leadership
methods employed by Stalin and the cult of personality. He proposed a
reevaluation of the system and mechanisms of its leadership. Khrushchev's
illusion was that by changing the leadership and functioning of the system
he would make it more effective and resolve its major problems.
During the Brezhnev period (1964-1982) a considerable number of
"improvements" were made to the leadership. The attempts made to revive the
economy by giving greater freedom to industry and a timid embracement of the
private sector clashed with the dominant principles of the totalitarian
system. There was talk of de-centralisation, collective initiative and new
economic mechanisms. However, not a word was said about the party monopoly
on power and finances, banks and the market. It would, however, have been
impossible to have freedom or private initiative without major changes to
the banking system, price liberalisation, reform to the system of investment
banking and the removal of large funds from the hands of the party and state
elite. It was quite absurd to make changes to the structures of property and
administration without changes to the principles of political power or
without profound changes to the legislative system and the guarantee of
constitutional rights and freedoms of its citizens.
History frequently provides us with examples of the combination of
heroism and illusion. Frequently the intellect of leaders and the grandeur
of their objectives have been let down by the naivety of the way in which
they attempted to achieva them. Such was the case with Stalin's opponents in
the 1920's and 30's and the policies of Nikita Khrushchev in the 1950's.
Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rikov and Bukharin paid for their naivety with their
lives since they were up against not only Stalin's will and cruelty but also
the interests and power of the party-state apparatus. Khrushchev also paid
for his own naivety and was removed from power in October 1964. For the ten
years he was in office, Khrushchev wavered between the desire to put an end
to the Stalinist repressions and the preservation of the system. The same
man who was bold enough to reveal the crimes of Stalin to the whole world
allowed cruel acts of repression against Soviet art and culture. The same
man who had the fortitude to remove the body of Stalin from the mausoleum in
Moscow became a proponent of the super-Utopian idea of the "rapid leap" into
the "paradise of communism".
The enormous belief that good could be imposed from above and that the
system could be revitalised by "the enthusiasm" and privileges of the
nomenclature, were naive. Khrushchev was no less a believer in the system of
state socialism. By throwing Stalin and Beria onto the scrapheap of history,
he deprived the Soviet people of their Divine leader and was obliged to
offer them a new Utopia - the rapid advent of communism, industrial
dominance over the USA and a high standard of living for the people of the
USSR etc.. After Krushchev's removal from power it became more difficult to
delude the people with promises of new Utopias and illusions. The myth of
the infallible leader in Stalin had been shattered. Khrushchev's programme
for entering the era of perfect communism by 1980 had failed. The next
utopia in line was Brezhnev's off-the-peg theory of a developed socialist
society.
Despite all this the logical question arises of why despite its general
instability the Soviet totalitarian system survived for such a long time -
74 years? I believe that there are a number of reasons for this.
The Soviet totalitarian model arose during a period of general crisis
and the large scale transformation of world capitalism, during a period of
globalisation and a search for various models of existence in a new
inter-dependent world. The 20th century was a time of cataclysm, change and
transition and of two world and hundreds of local wars in which more than
150 million people lost their lives. Despite its Utopian nature, the Soviet
system was a model for potential progress which emphasised absolute social
protection, guaranteed the interests of workers andpeasants and total
nationalisation as a condition for concentrating resources and directing
them towards new construction. The belief that universal social guarantees
were the basis for progress provided temporary historical justification for
the centralised type of society.
The continuing existence of the Soviet totalitarian system can be
explained with the desire and the ambitions of many nations rapidly to
overcome poverty and to avoid their possible colonisation by the larger
colonial metropolises. For many countries during the 1950's and the 1960's
the Soviet Union was a guarantee of protection against colonisation by other
countries, despite the fact that "fraternity" with the USSR meant another
type of dependence.
Was it not the case, however, that the crisis of liberalism and the
return to the ideas of nationalisation was also taking place in other parts
of the world? Practically everywhere in the world before and after the First
World War and especially at the end of the 1920's societes were undergoing
radical changes and centralisation. The victory of Hitler in Germany,
Mussolini in Italy, the Left in France and Spain was proof of this. The
crisis of world capitalism brought about by colonialism, monopolisation, the
First World War and the economic crisis of 1929-33 was sufficient motivation
and justification for the actions of Stalin as "necessary policies" in the
context of forthcoming world conflict. For millions of people the Soviet
Union was not so much a country of violent political aggression in which
millions of innocent people lost their lives but rather the power which
defeated Hitler, saved humanity from the death camps of fascism and gave a
chance to many peoples to live their lives in freedom and independence.
In 1932 in the introduction to his criticism of socialism, Ludwig von
Mizes wrote, "In Europe to the East of the Rhine there are very few
non-Marxists and even in Western Europe and the United States his (Marx)
supporters are greater in number than his opponents"[20]. If
today at the end of the 20th century, socialism is perceived as "something
bad in the past", for over half a century - from the 1920's to the 1970's it
was seen as the hope for the majority of mankind.
This is due to the not insignificant achievements of socialism in the
areas of industrialisation, science and technology, culture and art and,
most significantly, the social guarantees of labour, wages, a place to live
and so on. To disregard or to conceal these achievements would be imprudent,
and, indeed, impossible from an historical point of view. Each historical
period notwithstanding the nature of political power leaves behind it
something positive, guaranteeing the furtherance of human life. The
successes of the USSR in industrialisation, transforming it from a country
surviving on the remnants of a system of feudal agriculture into a world
super-power, guaranteed wages, work and income for the vast masses of its
population were for many people sufficient grounds for maintaining the
system.
I, therefore, do not consider the model of state socialism to be the
ravings of a group of mad politicians. Its appearance, existence and
dissemination over the whole world from the second half of the 19th century
to the end of the 20th was a consequence of huge world transformations and
reactions against the imperialist colonial world with its injustices and
wars. Despite its illusions and errors it was a conscious attempt to offer
protection to the interests of the oppressed and division and class
struggles to be replaced with unification and social unity.
I realise how difficult it is only a few years after the collapse of
the totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe for these words to be uttered.
However, we should not be too hasty in our evaluation of history from the
point of view of a specific political moment in time. The continued
existence of the Soviet type of system and the popularity of the communist
idea during the greater part of the 20th century was a consequence of the
objective and global processes of transition of the modern world. It was a
part of the processes of world integration, but also a part of the crisis of
the Third Civilisation. The same factors which provided the opportunities to
state socialism also dug its grave. Continuing global integration could no
longer tolerate isolationism. Social guarantees led to the demotivation of
labour. The growth in personal and group self-confidence were limited by the
lack of basic human rights. The reason for the collapse of this system was
its tendency to consume more than it produced and to maintain "balance" via
the methodical use of aggression upon the personal freedoms of its citizens.
The very idea of achieving universal justice and material plenty via
coercion and "forced awareness" were Utopian and inhumane.
The contradictions arose from the economic essence of the system, from
the type of ownership, and not from the style and methods of leadership, as
Khrushchev considered. Khrushchev did not attempt to change the system
which, in its turn, killed him politically. His illusions were inherited
from Bukharin and in the end the system was doomed to failure. However, that
which was planted by Khrushchev, the desire for change, eventually gave
fruit. On the one hand because the reformers within the Soviet party and
state leadership were able to learn from its lessons and on the other since
they were all aware that partial and cosmetic changes would not lead to
success.
Twenty years and four months had passed since Khrushchev was removed
from office when on the 11th of March 1985 Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was
elected to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union.
3. THE TWO OPTIONS AND THE MISTAKE OF GORBACHEV
Gorbachev had two options - to change the system either by liberalising
the economy
or by changing the political system. The first option would have
guaranteed stability
and a gradual transition, the second - conflict and chaos. In any event
neither he nor his successors had a plan for global action.
A
t the beginning of 1985 the majority of the Soviet population was ready
for change. It was tired of the drawn-out death throes of the Brezhnev
leadership, filled with hope when Yuri Andropov came to power, crushed by
his death soon after that and his replacement with the aging Brezhnevite
Konstantin Chernenko. Soviet society and in particular the intelligentsia
during this period were tired of the endless speeches and demagogy, of the
discrepancies between words and reality, of the empty shelves and the
universal lack of everything which the ordinary member of the public might
require. Mikhail Gorbachev found not only fertile ground for change but he
indeed became the natural mouthpiece for the expression of all the ambitions
and hopes of the majority of Soviet society.
During his first year of office Gorbachev made significant changes to
the politburo, the government, the leadership of the armed forces and
foreign ministry. It was during this period that Edward Shevernadze came to
the fore in the Soviet leadership as foreign minister and member of the
politburo. A.Yakovlev became the leader of the propaganda section of the
Central Committee of the CPSU. Boris Yeltsin became the leader of the Moscow
party committee of the CPSU. In practice these were the three political
figures who most radically and faithfully supported the political and
economic reforms.
In 1985 Gorbachev opened up the way for improvements in Soviet and
American relations in the areas of arms control policy and the radical
reduction in first-strike nuclear weapons. The summit meeting held between
Gorbachev and the American president Ronald Reagan in November 1985 in
Geneva was the beginning of a turn-around in world nuclear arms policy. In
1986 Gorbachev accelerated personnel changes in the leadership of the
communist party and the Soviet state as well as in the mass media and local
party apparatus.
I believe that these first two years were decisive for Gorbachev's
choice of strategy. Undoubtedly, the change which he began were on a much
larger scale than those of Khrushchev and affected all areas of life.
Despite this in 1985 and 1986 Gorbachev continued to pursue the idea of
revitalising the system in the aims of "more socialism". In June 1986 in
Habarovsk he formulated the essence of "perestroika" and the need for its
advancement. During this period the people of the USSR were allowed much
greater spiritual freedom and learnt many truths about their history and the
outrages of Stalinism.
Now, looking back on the documents and facts of this period, it can be
seen that Gorbachev did not have a plan for global action. He had not
imagined that perestroika would cause such global transformations. The
General Secretary of the CPSU was motivated by the idea of strengthening
Soviet society and socialism, rather than overthrowing the culture and
system of a waning civilisation. This "provinciality" in his attitude to a
global power, such as the USSR was, is quite evident in his thousands of
speeches and articles of the time, however, it is also proof of the lack of
the global responsibility necessary for the leader of one of the two super
powers.[21]
Gorbachev had two options. The first of these was to give priority to
economic reforms (similar to Hungary and China) with simultaneous guarantees
of centralised power followed by the gradual implementation of political
reforms. The second option was to introduce political reforms followed by
economic reforms. If he had opted for the first option he would have had
further opportunities for global influence, but he did not and plunged the
USSR into a network of internal conflicts.
From the speeches made by Gorbachev between 1985 and 1986 it can be
seen that he did not underestimate economic reform and wanted to find a way
of implementing reform both in the economy and in politics. It is, however,
clear that Gorbachev and his allies were thinking on their feet and that
they did not have a clear action plan suitable for universal, global change.
The political campaigns began to take a hold but economic reforms tended to
falter in their tracks. The simultaneous implementation of economic and
political reforms in actual fact gave weight to the latter. As Gorbachev
announced the policy of Glasnost and began to reveal the truth about the
past, he put the authority of the party apparatus under threat and accepted
the enormous challenge of political reforms and the divisive inner-party
conflicts. The beginning of "perestroika" through the policy of "glasnost"
in essence meant the priority of political reform over economic reform. This
fact was of decisive significance for the fate of the USSR and Eastern
Europe and the whole world. If Gorbachev had delayed political reform and
had placed the accent on the economy, this would not have lead so rapidly to
the chaotic collapse of the Eastern European systems and the USSR. Such a
transition would not have lead to the explosion of nationalism and dozens of
local wars and conflicts. The Eastern European nations would not have become
a burden for the developed Western European nations and there would not have
been the need for billions of dollars in financial aid.
Gorbachev's choice was not the result of a deliberately thought-out
plan but rather the result of circumstances. However, having opted for a
model of change, sooner rather than later local conflicts and the collapse
of Eastern European structures were inevitable. Of the reasons for such a
denouement, one is of particular significance. The integrated nature of the
totalitarian system was totally reliant on the centralised nature of power.
In contrast to market economies where people are linked by an enormous
number of horizontal connections independent of the central power, in a
totalitarian economy social integration is maintained via central state
institutions. This applies not only to economic entities but also to ethnic
groups and the structures of information exchange and culture.
Rapid reforms to the system of political authority without economic
foundations within a totalitarian society by definition pose a risk of the
entire system collapsing in chaos. Imagine factories which are accustomed to
receiving materials allocated to them by the central planning institutions.
The destruction of this institution or change within the political or
administrative system allows the factories to sell to whom they want and to
ignore whom they want. The result of this is that at one fell swoop
thousands and millions of economic bonds are severed and the chaos becomes
unimaginable.
This was also the case in the area of international relations. Under
totalitarianism many national groups were able to co-exist peacefully within
the order imposed from above and any conflicts between them were
cosmetically concealed. However, these peoples peoples lacked sufficient
horizontal economic and cultural bonds as for example is the case with the
various nationalities inhabiting Switzerland. After the collapse of the
central power, nations which had until the previous day been good neighbours
began to divide up territories, power, money and in many cases opened up the
way for armed conflict with tanks and weapons.
Whether Gorbachev understood the scale of the emerging crisis is a
question of some doubt. What is clear, however, is that during this period
economic reforms made no progress, whereas political reforms began to give
rise to greater and greater conflicts. In January 1987, a little more than a
month after the release of Sakharov from internal exile, Mikhail Gorbachev
laid before the Central Committee of the CPSU a series of measures aimed at
political reform. These included secret ballots with multiple candidates and
the election of non-communists to senior state posts, participation of
employees in the election of directors at their place of work, the reduction
of state ownership in favour of cooperative ownership and so on. This was
not only a direct and decisive blow to the party apparatus and its vested
interests, but also to the power structure itself. After this plenum
feelings of opposition to perestroika began to make themselves felt. The
indignation of the party apparatus was total and reactions became more and
more overt. However, the inertia of change was too great to be stopped. In
1987 a process of political rehabilitation of intellectuals repressed by
Stalin began and the first timid steps were being made towards the opening
of private cooperative shops.
In the same year, which I consider the zenith of the perestroika, a
number of serious problems began to manifest themselves. Most significant of
these was the fact that "perestroika" had given practically no positive
economic results and had not alleviated the problems faced by ordinary
people. The successes which were being achieved in the medium range arms
negotiations were having less and less influence on the public opinion.
People were more concerned with the lack of goods in the shops. In October
1987 the first nationalist conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaidjan flared
up. This was the beginning of the general crisis in national relations
within the USSR. At the same time a number of diverse, but well organised,
opposition groups began to appear within the Soviet leadership. On the one
hand, both within the Central Committee of the CPSU and outside it the
opposition to Gorbachev's reforms was becoming more vocal and aimed at the
preservation of the status quo of single party power and the totalitarian
system. On the other hand, in October 1987, Boris Yeltsin made official
accusations against Gorbachev and Ligachev, marking the beginning of a
political movement aimed at more radical and liberal reforms.
From this moment on Gorbachev was obliged to strike a balance between
these two groups which limited his flexibility and making his action seems
more contradictory. The General Secretary was neither able to turn back,
which would have marked the end of his career and perestroika, nor was he
free enough to make sufficient intensive progress. Gorbachev had already
surpassed Khrushchev but was not safe from the same fate.
In November 1988, Estonia declared its independence and the right of
the Supreme Council of Estonia to veto laws passed by the Soviet parliament.
Mass independence movements began in Lithuania and Latvia. The ethnic
tension between Armenia and Azerbaidjan continued. In this situation, on the
7th of December 1988, Gorbachev announced to the UN that the Soviet army
would be reduced by half a million and the pull-out of Soviet troops from
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany began. The Soviet leader called for
a new world order. This was his biggest tactical mistake. He realised his
global responsibility too late. When Gorbachev finally understood his
decisive significance in international reform and in general, as well as the
fate of perestroika,he had already lost his power.
4. THE COLLAPSE OF PERESTROIKA
The collapse of perestroika in 1991 had been foreseen as early as the
end of 1988.
With the conflicts which ensued, it will be evaluated by modern
historians as a process filled with contradictions. On the other hand, it
opened the floodgates to new opportunities for progress and history in the
long-term will appreciate as the catalyst for the advent
of the new civilisation.
I
shall take a more detailed look at the changes which took place in
Eastern Europe not only because since I lived through them personally but
because I am convinced of the fact that the events of 1986--1991 will affect
our fate for many years to come. 1989 and 1990 were years of the gradual
"fiasco" of perestroika as a line of evolutionary change within the
totalitarian system. Its collapse took several forms. Firstly -- the
complete failure of economic reforms and, consequently, the reduced support
for perestroika on the part of the Soviet people. Secondly -- allowing the
local inter-ethnic conflicts to get out of hand and the consequent explosion
of ethnic self-confidence and demands. Thirdly -- the collapse of the
Eastern European political and military alliances and the severance of ties
between the Eastern European nations and Moscow.
As early as the beginning of January 1989 the majority of Soviet
republics began to pass a series of new laws establishing their own
languages as the official language of the republic. In March of the same
year in the first free elections for the Congress of the People's Deputies
the nationalist movements in the Baltic Republics won the absolute majority.
In May, Lithuania and Estonia and in July Latvia, in spite of Moscow's
displeasure, passed a law, declaring their independence. The question arose
of the fate of the USSR, its integrity and unity and the future of the
central leadership. This was, indeed, Gorbachev's most serious ordeal and
the precursor of the final collapse of perestroika. The opposition of the
neo-communists within the Soviet leadership was a powerful force in favour
of preserving the unity of the Soviet Union and hard-line policies.
The potential collapse of the Soviet Union was unacceptable for the
Moscow elite, mainly for ideological reasons. It is not to be underestimated
that for 70 years millions of people in the former USSR were absolutely
convinced of the need for its existence and of the idea and meaning of the
Soviet system. No less important is the fact that the collapse of the USSR
was de facto to signify the demise of all the higher leadership posts. In
1990 and 1991 such a possibility instilled feelings of insecurity in the
Soviet elite. Tens of thousands of senior civil servants, amongst them
leading figures in the Moscow government, were threatened with losing their
jobs.
There is another side to the question which has to be considered. The
majority of the world political elite considered the potential collapse of
the USSR as a complex and possibly dangerous issue. From my direct personal
conversations with senior politicians in the USA, France, Germany and
Austria and other countries and from indirect political analyses, I have the
impression that in 1990 and 1991 only the minority of them were in favour of
a collapse of the USSR. The world was concerned about the appearance of new
nuclear powers such as the Ukraine and Kazakhstan and the potential of
large-scale military conflict with the possible use of nuclear arms. The
insecurity of this super power was a matter of concern for all. This
insecurity could also be felt in Moscow. It coincided with increased
criticism of the economic and social policies of the CPSU. The leaders of
the other Eastern European states, members of the Warsaw Pact, were amongst
those who were becoming vocal in their criticism.
The most significant factor which was to sound the death knell for
perestroika was the explosion of ethnic and nationalist tension within the
USSR itself. IN January 1990, thousands of Azeris protested near to the
Soviet border with Iran. A few days later the Lithuanian communist party
ratified Lithuania's independence. On the 11th of January, Armenia exercised
its right to veto Soviet legislation, following the example of the Baltic
states. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaidjan over Nagorni Karabakh
continues to escalate. Protests and tension began to make themselves felt in
Moldova and Tadzhikistan. These were clearly not individual phenomena but
symptoms of the general collapse of the USSR.
On the 7th of February 1990, the Central Committee of the CPSU accepted
in essence the idea of a multi-party political system as the basis for the
creation of democratic socialism. In February and March during the local
government elections the established nomenclature lost many senior positions
in favour of independent and largely unknown new leaders. A little later,
V.Landsbergis was elected as the first non-communist president of a Soviet
republic. From this moment on the process of collapse began to accelerate.
Gorbachev had clearly begun to lose control of events. After 1989 the rate
of change was no longer being dictated by Gorbachev or his entourage. On the
other hand it must be appreciated that Gorbachev did not give in to the
temptations or the suggestions to halt the reform process with the help of
the army.[22]
By the middle of 1990 it was already evident that the three Baltic
republics would achieve full independence. The next great challenge came
from Kiev where the Ukraine, on the 16th February, also declared its
independence. In August another group of Soviet republics declared their
independence. Gorbachev was left the with the only alternative of proposing
a new union of independent republics. His suggestion to reorganise his
cabinet to include the leaders of all 15 republics showed that even as late
as November 1990 the central Soviet leadership was unaware of the real pace
of the reform processes and their real scale and power. In December
Kirgizia, the last remaining 15th republic declared its independence.
During the period (November--December 1990) the opposition against
Gorbachev had begun to increase and he was forced to make compromises. In
December 1990 he was forced to dismiss some of his most loyal allies and
supporters of the reform process. On the 2nd of December the Minister of the
Interior was replaced by Boris Pugo and on the 26th of December Gorbachev
put forward Genadiy Yanaev for the post of Vice-President of the Union. I do
not believe that it would be a contravention of political ethics I if were
to share my personal impressions from the meeting I had with Genadiy Yanaev
the day after he was elected to the post of the Vice-President of the USSR.
From my conversation with him it soon became clear that the election of
Yanaev was a return of those forces which desired the stabilisation of the
situation, the preservation of the USSR, more hard-line politics and a
desire to use the position of Gorbachev to achieve these aims.
In the same month, December 1990, the head of the KGB, V.Kriuchkov
began to become more vocal and to increase the authority of his position by
officially proclaiming the time-worn slogans of the danger posed by the CIA
and that the KGB was prepared to fight against any anti-communist forces. On
the other hand, one must not forget the exceptional foresight and shrewdness
of the foreign minister of the time, Edward Shevardnadze, who warned of the
imminent possibility of dictatorship. During the entire period of 1991
Gorbachev was forced to manoeuvre between these influences, hoping to
preserve the Soviet Union and to continue his line of paced reform within
the ideology of perestroika, albeit in an new form.
When I look back and analyse the events of those days, I find it
impossible not to believe that the conflict which took place at the end of
1990 was impossible for two major factors: on the one hand, the increased
rate of the disintegration of the Soviet state via the development of
democratic and completely independent movements in all the former Soviet
republics while on the other -- the threats to the interests of the ruling
elite and the increased activity of the majority of the Soviet leadership
aimed at the preservation of the status quo.
And so we arrive at the attempted coup of the 19th of August 1991. One
question begs to be answered: Did Gorbachev and other proponents of
perestroika know of the imminent coup and its scale? I do not believe so, at
least in terms of specifics. They could not have failed to have seen the
storm on the horizon or have felt the potential danger, but nothing more. On
the 16th of August A.Yakovliev warned that a coup was being prepared in
Russia, but this was more of a political conclusion than information based
on specific facts. A month later, on the 15[th] of September I
had a long conversation in Moscow with Yakovliev and Shevernadze. My
profound conviction from these talks is that they had both had a foreboding
of the events but had not believed that it could take place so quickly. I
feel that Gorbachev was of the same opinion. They had not believed for
example that the minister of defence, D. Yazov, could be involved in such a
plot. They had not believed that the entire council of ministers of the USSR
would be so willing to reject the new Treaty of Union to replace to the USSR
with a Confederation of Independent States. Of course, there were many
inexplicable occurrences during the course of the attempted coup, but that
is the way of politics. Large-scale change is often connected with many
inexplicable events when the momentary psychological or physical conditions
of an individual or group of individuals can be of decisive significance for
events.
The intention of the leaders of the coup was to carry replace Gorbachev
quietly, or at least to put him out of the way in reserve. Yanaev,
Kriuchkov, Pavlov[23] and others had evidently been in favour of
the maximum flexibility in the change of power with the eventual gradual
restoration of the Soviet regime. Gorbachev had to be convinced to withdraw
for reasons of illness or nervous exhaustion or to come into line with the
leaders of the coup and to "cure" himself of his illusions. There were clear
analogies with the coup of August 1991 and the removal of Khrushchev from
power in October 1964 -- a statement regarding the illness of the leader,
putting the troops on alert along with a declaration that they would not be
used as an elementary attempted to pacify the people and international
society.
There were, however, enormous differences between 1991 and 1964.
Underestimating these differences was one of the biggest mistakes the
leaders of the coup made. In August 1991 the Russian nation and in
particular the Russian intelligentsia were of a completely different state
of mind. Their thirst for and their experiences of freedom were stronger
than any more primitive feelings for preserving the status quo.
Notwithstanding economic difficulties, masses of the Soviet people had
experienced the taste of free life. Although perestroika in terms of
strategy and tactics was already bankrupt, it had lead to profound changes
in the way of thinking of wide ranging social groups. The 19th of August was
the litmus test which in reality showed what had been achieved by Gorbachev.
Perestroika had not only unleashed the will of the people but had also given
it the self-confidence not to heed what was said to them "from above".
Shortly after the attempted coup the rock group, "The Scorpions"
released their hit "The Winds of Change", dedicated to those who had
thwarted the coup. Indeed, this wind came from the heart of the reformed
Soviet society, from the new spirit cultivated by perestroika.
On the day after the coup, on the 20th of August, several hundred
thousand demonstrators protested against it in St.Petersburg, thousands
surrounded the White House. Huge demonstrations were organised in the larger
towns of Russia. Major sections of the Russian army refused to carry out the
orders of leaders of the coup or take any decisive actions. On the evening
of the 20th of August it was already becoming apparent that the
self-proclaimed "Committee of salvation" had lost control over the
situation. At that moment the leaders of the coup had two choices: either to
declare a bloody civil war with no predictable outcome or to sound the
retreat.
In the final outcome, the coup was thwarted by the decisive actions of
Boris Yeltsin and his supporters, but also by the millions of ordinary
Russian people who were unwilling to make compromises with their
consciences, the generals and officers whose thoughts and deeds were not
limited by party interests and remained loyal to their exalted mission. I
will never forget my telephone conversation at that time with Edward
Shevernadze. At the time of the conversation the outcome of the conflict was
far from clear. Despite this I felt in him not only his decisiveness to
engage in the struggle, but also a clear feeling of responsibility to avoid
the unthinkable -- to avoid a civil war or a large-scale thermo-nuclear war.
I feel tempted to write that not only in the USSR but in other countries as
well the driving forces of change were the standard bearers of the emergent
new civilisation. Many of them, perhaps still unconsciously, other, thinking
with the criteria of world progress, and yet others since they had just had
enough of thinking the way other people wanted them to think.
The 19th of August 1991 was the real date of the end of perestroika and
the start of new beginnings in the process of economic and political reforms
in the USSR. The collapse of the coup meant, in practice, the collapse of
the major forces which were holding up the reform process. It meant
something else as well: together with the ban on the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union and the dismissal of the Council of Ministers, the arrest of
the conspirators the main it resulted in the removal of the main
institutions of power which until that moment had held the USSR together.
Making the most of this moment, in the days following the failed coup, the
former Soviet republics confirmed their announcements of independence. The
new union treaty of which the leaders of the coup had been so frightened and
which would have saved the Union was forgotten. The new directly elected
president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, began a series of direct contacts with
the leaders of the former Soviet republics and with only a few months
withdrew the prerogatives of the centralised Soviet ministries. This in
reality meant the collapse of the USSR and the passing of its basic rights
and obligations into the domain of the Russian republic.
After coming to terms with the huge public support for the actions of
Boris Yeltsin, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned in 1991.[24] This was
the end of a significant period in the history of the nations of the former
USSR. As paradoxical as it may seem, this period also marked the beginning
of a new era in the development of the world. The collapse of one of the two
superpowers meant in practice the collapse of the bi-polar world and
together with this the structures which were typical of the Third
Civilisation.
5. THE EXPLOSION IN EASTERN EUROPE
The radical changes within Eastern Europe during the period between
1989 and 1990 were the first part of the universal political restructuring
of the world order.
These changes began as a huge emotional outpouring soon to be followed
by enormous problems and disappointments.
A
number of experts on the subject believe that the changes in the
Eastern Europe were the result of