understandings reached by Gorbachev and Reagan at their numerous meetings, in particular in Malta. My personal opinion is that these processes could not have come about as the result of any agreement. The changes were a result of the growth in self-confidence of the Eastern European peoples as a consequence of perestroika, of the confidence in the influence of the democratic movements and the feeling that Gorbachev and his entourage were losing control over power. The extent of the influence of the reforms which took place in the USSR after 1985 on the countries in Eastern Europe was enormous. In Bulgaria, for example, whose language is very close to Russian, the most popular newspapers between 1986 and 1989 were not Bulgarian but Soviet. The spirit of perestroika, the revelations of truths about the past, the constant reminders that the Utopias of the totalitarian regimes were bankrupt lead to enormous changes in people's attitudes and prepared the way for the beginning of the explosion. Despite differences in scale and methods, all the "socialist" countries of Eastern Europe began to give birth to new civil movements and the growth in free expression and the desire for profound reforms. On the 6th of March 1989 the speaker of the Soviet foreign ministry, Gerasimov, announced that the future of every Eastern European country lay in its own hands. In this way he officially dismissed the Brezhnev doctrine which guaranteed the control of Moscow over all its Eastern European satellites. There is no doubt that Gorbachev had given prior notice of this announcement to his Western partners. From this moment on, events unfolded at an unbelievable pace. In May 1989 the Hungarian government dominated by reformist communists opened its border with Austria and allowed thousands of citizens from the former German Democratic Republic to travel to West Germany. A little later the Polish trade union "Solidarity" achieved a decisive victory in the elections to the Senate and part of the lower chamber of the Polish Sejm. Moscow accepted these events calmly, thus proving that it had indeed accepted a new policy towards Eastern Europe. On the 7th of July at a summit meeting of the Warsaw pact countries in Bucharest, Gorbachev declared that all the members of the pact were at liberty to chose their own paths. What was the objective of the Soviet leadership in relation to its former allies? Analysing the experience of Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and a number of other Eastern European countries of this period, I believe that between the spring and summer of 1989 Gorbachev had begun to apply a policy based on two main theses: first of all -- the rejection of the "Brezhnev doctrine" on the limitation of sovereignty and allowing greater freedom to the governments of the relevant countries; secondly -- the replacement of the old leaderships with new, more pragmatic leaders and the preservation of the Soviet zone of influence on the basis on new alliances and treaties. This, however, involved the same theoretical and practical problem as in the Soviet Union. On the one hand, Gorbachev wanted to give greater freedom and to support the reform processes within the Eastern European communist parties. On the other hand, he could or would not comprehend the scale of the explosion, the fuse of which he had lighted himself. The reform processes resembled an uncorked bottle of champagne rather than a well-thought out scheme. After liberation of their spirits, the people would no longer accept leaders imposed upon them from above and pouring out onto the streets and squares they demonstrated new power and self-confidence. After the summit meeting in Bucharest in July 1989 events unfolded like a chain reaction. On the 7th of October Gorbachev directly influenced the beginning of reforms in the DDR and on the 18th of October Erik Honneker was replaced by Egon Krenz. A few days later the Berlin wall came down. On the 10th of November the Bulgarian communist leader, Todor Zhivkov, was replaced by Petar Mladenov, who was favoured by the Soviet leadership. At the end of November and the beginning of December after mass unrest in Prague, a new government was formed consisting mainly of non-communists and on the 29th of December Vaclav Havel became the first non-communist president from more that 40 years. During the last few days of December the Rumanian dictator and his wife were killed after a military coup and a hastily improvised trial. From the point of view of the history of the Eastern European nations these changes had enormous significance. They followed the logic of the analogous changes which were taking place within the USSR, but rapidly overtook them in terms of their speed and depth. Apart from the universal elements of the crisis within the USSR there were the additional factors of the struggle and aspirations of the smaller Eastern European nations for complete sovereignty and independence. This also helps to explain the more radical nature of the changes which took place within them. From a global point of view the explosion in Eastern Europe was the first phase of the larger geo-political changes and the creation of a new world order. The changes in Moscow, Berlin, Sofia, Prague, Budapest and Bucharest, together with the collapse of the USSR can be determined as the beginning of the collapse of the Third Civilisation. The military and political alliances of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON were rendered pointless. The political map of Europe had changed beyond recognition. The democratic changes in Eastern Europe could have taken place in a different way but they could not have been avoided. The changes were a consequence of the crisis of the totalitarian regimes, their inability to adapt to the large technological and political changes in the world and the requirements of the new age. The administrative coercion of the one-party system and the repression of private economic initiative were shown to be historical mistakes. Only history will decide what would have been best for the world -- either the "Chinese" model of reform by placing priority on economic reform, or the "velvet revolutions" which in reality took place. I have to say personally, that not only in Bulgaria but in most of the other Eastern European countries very few people believed in the rapid demise of the USSR before 1989. No-one could believe that a super power such as the USSR could allow itself to reject its global privileges or that the leader of such a super power would voluntarily "concede" his "conquests" without wanting anything in return. And now, looking back to the facts of 5--6 years ago, I can see for myself yet again, that the changes in Eastern Europe were not thought out beforehand, not were they carried out effectively from a regional or global point of view. The West was carried away with the "ideological" ecstasy that communism was on its way out. In the Eastern European countries themselves the nature of the changes was motivated mainly by internal conflicts and clashes. In some Eastern European countries restorationalists got the upper hand, with aspirations to restore to themselves the pre-war rights they had lost. Radical change from strong state regulation to radical liberalism had its destructive consequences. It was clear that in this way the Eastern European countries would undergo a long period of instability and a slow adaptation to the European Community. From a positive point of view, the most important consequences of the changes in Eastern Europe were the destruction of internal obstructions to world integration and the creation of the new structures of the global world. At the same time the discovery of new virgin territory for world globalisation was far from promising world harmony. Realisation was soon to come in the West that the belief in the final victory of world capitalism was wrong. In the East internal conflicts continued. New solutions had to be found while the common crisis persisted... 6. RETURN TO A DIFFICULT FUTURE Was the return to power of the former Eastern European socialist parties a logical stage in development? There is a common reason for this. It was a confirmation of the thesis that the political process is not a series of happenstances but is rather governed by a definite logical process. A fter the series of mainly "gentle" revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990 and the changes which took place later in the USSR, the period between 1993 and 1995 was marked by a series of elections in which the former communist parties (or their political successors) were returned to power. In Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia the former communists won categorical victories at the polls. In December this was repeated in Russia by the communist party lead by G.Zuganov. In Rumania and Yugoslavia the former communists never actually left power. This gave rise to the question which is not uppermost in the minds of modern thinkers and politicians: was this return to power of the ex-communist parties a logical stage in development? I have to admit that during the five or six years of the reform process many of these parties did undergo profound changes. They accepted the values of democracy and pluralism and changed their platforms. In contrast to the newly-formed parties of anti-communists, democrats and liberals they had well organised party structures and people faithful to them in all sectors of economic power. Some of these parties together with the structures of the former state security organisations had been preparing themselves for pluralism and opposition politics as early as the period of perestroika. Economic domination, the creation of their own "loyal" dissident and political circles, the infiltration of trusted members into the newly-formed anti-communist parties - all this was undoubtedly well planned and had a strong influence on the political situation. The most important reason for the return of the ex-communist parties to power, in my opinion, can be found in the nature of the totalitarian system and the logical stages in its change. What I referred to earlier as the "mistake" of Gorbachev was also decisive here. The new democratic, radical and liberal forces came to the forefront riding high on the wave of political reform. E.Gaidar and A.Chubais in Russia, L.Balzerovic in Polish and Y.Antal in Hungary all became symbols of the reform. All the reformers, however, were faced with the same problem - while political changes could be carried out radically and quickly, economic reform required time, trained specialists and techniques specifically designed for the transition from extreme centralism to a market economy. The "phased" discrepancies between economic and political changes caused economic difficulties, serious political clashes and crime. The explosion of emotions and anti-communism of the autumn of 1989 and during the period between 1990-1991 succeeded in alienating the former administrative and economic elite from the new democrats. Their more or less forced removal from ministries and state factories provided them with significant opportunities in the private sector where they acted in close cooperation with tens of thousands of well-trained experts from the former state security organisations. The only way for the new democratic forces to control the economic forces was to get them on their side, as happened in the Czech republic. Elsewhere where pragmatism was replaced with virulent anti-communism, the new political forces were unable to control the economic sector sufficiently to carry out large-scale reforms. The economic forces, banks, factories and the private sector, in general remained in the hands of people trained by the former totalitarian regime. The second important reason was the disappointment of the population. One group of the population had benefitted from a series of social privileges and guarantees under the totalitarian regime. By supporting the reforms between 1989 and 1990 many of these people expected a rapid solution to the problems which they were experiencing and not the chaos, crime and fall in living standards and production which in reality ensued. Unfortunately, as a result of the delays in economic reform during the period of perestroika and the clashes with the harsh reality of the open world economy these hopes remain unfulfilled. Bulgaria did not become a Balkan Switzerland, as some of its leaders promised, nor did Rumania become France. Quite the contrary, the populations of the Eastern European countries had to come to terms with the unwelcome news that they produced little, consumed much more and had to reverse this ratio by 180 percent. For these reasons in 1992 almost all the Eastern European countries experienced a profound change in social attitudes. The political elite who had been in power from 1989-1990 were forced to realise in terror that their sleepless nights, the titanic struggle and reforms were now considered by many as mistaken. Of course, it should be added that many of the new democrats did in fact make many mistakes. In the long run the radical nature of the economic reforms in the period between 1989 and 1990 and the delay in implementing economic reforms led to the political equilibrium being upset. Sooner or later it had to be restored. A significant percentage of the population in Eastern Europe had become impoverished and disappointed. They preferred to vote for the former communist parties seeing in them hope for the restoration of the social benefits which they had lost. However, can the reformed communists live up to these expectations? The answer is a conditional "no", or a partial "no". The condition is that they undertake a flexible policy of reform aimed at the widest possible social strata of society. Due to the legislative changes which have been undertaken, any return to the past is unlikely, although to a certain extent still possible, mainly in Russia. There still remains the difficult path of peaceful reforms needed to achieve successful economic policies. For this reason the return of the ex-communist parties is a return to a difficult future. It will not halt the global processes of integration, nor will it delay the processes of moving towards new, civilising social relations. After the battle of Waterloo at the beginning of the 19th century, the processes of restoration in France looked inexorable and many believed in it. However, it was to be seen that once the seeds of revolutionary ideas had been sown, it was to be very difficult to destroy them, the freedoms that had been won could not be taken away. Such is the case with the return of the ex-communist parties to power. They will either have to adapt to the new civilising realities or they will thrown onto the scrapheap of history. For the ex-communist parties of Hungary and Poland this will be easier, their ideological reformation began a long time before they came back to power. For the Bulgarian Socialist Party or the Party of Social Democracy in Rumania this will be more difficult. Whatever the outcome, the reflected processes of global transition in Eastern Europe will not be smooth. As a reaction to the errors and the collapse of perestroika politics went too far to the right and then turned sharply to the left. The realities of life will put the former socialist parties to the test. Some of them will rise to the challenge and some will fall victim to the contradiction of their own ideological contradictions, while still others will collapse under the pressure of vested interests. Whether the New Civilisation will accept them is a matter that the future will show us. Chapter Three COLLAPSE II: GLOBAL DISORDER 1. THE DANGER OF CHAOS Ever change of epoch takes place in the context of conflict and disorder. The crisis in the East is just the first phase of the changes in the present global political order. The second phase will take place in the West and Far East... T he universal processes of globalisation and the collapse of the Eastern European regimes have given rise to a whole series of unfamiliar phenomena. Humanity has entered a new phase of development marked by the huge and growing level of mutual interdependence between people, nations and cultures. The global order based on the principles of bi-polarism of two super powers and which had dominated since the Second World War has been destroyed. To a large extent the way in which the Eastern European regimes collapsed lead to this state of chaos firstly in their own countries and later in international economic and political relations. I define chaos as a universal crisis of the spiritual and value systems, the rejection of certain standards of global intercourse and the instability of others, as a period of relative disorder leading to change in the world order. The first phase of this chaos began in 1989--1900 with the collapse of the Eastern European regimes and the economic and military organisations in this part of the world. The dissolution of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact in the space of a few months led to chaos in economic relations within Eastern Europe. The mutual export of goods between the former members of these organisations fell sharply. Almost all the countries in the region lost their markets and the stability of their industrial structures was all but destroyed. Later this was followed by the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. A number of ethnic conflicts flared up, some of which developed into full-scale wars. For the three years between 1990--1993 the region was in absolute chaos. I believe that this first stage will be followed by a second, very important stage of changes. This second stage, which has already begun is affecting the larger Western powers and their mutual relations, with new roles and positions being assumed by the Asian states and the acceptance of new principles in international economic and cultural relations and with formation of new institutions for the regulations of global processes etc.. Some of them will want to preserve the status quo and their position of dominance, while others will want to prove old theories. However, there is only one truth: the post-war global order has lost a number of its main foundations. Humanity has entered a transitionary period from the bi-polar model to a new, unfamiliar global structure. The universal crisis of the post-war political model had caused and continues to cause the general collapse of contacts and relations wwhich will be of great significance for further development. There are two interrelated factors which are of influence on the processes which are taking place: globalisation as a fundamental and continuous phenomenon and the crisis in Eastern Europe which was provoked by globalisation and which at the same time has accelerated its pace. The problem, however, is that no-one, or almost no-one was prepared for what happened - neither the collapse of the iron curtain, nor the consequences of the new drive towards globalisation and its side effects. I want to speak of the dangers posed by chaos and general disorder mainly because after the collapse of the Eastern European regimes not one of the factors which caused the universal crisis of contemporary civilisation has dissappeared entirely.The deformations of economic growth remain and global ecological problems have yet to be solved. After the renewal of nuclear tests, albeit tactical, by France in September 1995 no-one any longer believes that disarmament is irreversible. In the context of the bi-polar model the world was governed by two super powers and a group of nations dependent on them. Today the level of direct government has sharply declined. After the collapse of the USSR a number of new pretenders to world leadership have appeared and before our very eyes the roles and relations of former allies have changed radically. Politics is no longer two-dimensional but an equation with hundreds of unknowns. A clear example of the ontradictions between the great powers can be seen in the war in the former Yugoslavia. The vested interests of certain states, in assisting various leaders and arming different armies demonstrate that the old political tradition, the tradition of the bi-polar world has long since passed away. Or let us take Europe. The unification of the two Germanies did not only impose a series of new responsibilities on West Germany but has created complex problems for pan-European processes. Germany transferred part of the burden of unification on to its European partners via the mechanisms of international financial relations. The integration of the two German states has changed the structure of Europe and the relations of the states within it. The granting ofassociate membership status to the Eastern European countries within the structures of the EU seemed in 1989-1991 a relatively easy task but was soon delayed almost indefinitely. This was to a certain extent because of the unwillingness of Russia to allow itself to be encircled by a new "iron" or other type of curtain. The place and role of Russia itself in the global community are still unclear. In the global aspect the collapse of the Eastern European regimes has had even greater consequences. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its economic potential to all intents and purposes removed one of the two main super powers from the geo-political map. Only the USA remains. A number of years have passed and there are already voices which proclaim that the super powers are no longer necessary. France has offered to extend its nuclear umbrella over Germany. Germany and Japan have demonstrated their desires to become permanent members of the Security Council.Russia has officially requested membership of the group of the most developed nations. The collapse of the Eastern European economic and political structures has opened up a hole in world economic relations with consequences for the world economic order. A not insignificant number of investments have flowed into Eastern Europe. West Germany's great commitments to its new Eastern provinces have resulted in a deterioration in the condition of the European exchange rate system. Without the burdens of such problems, Japan and a number of other countries in the Far East have continued to develop their potential and to exert more and more influence on the world economic processes. China has demonstrated high levels of growth and a flourishing economy. The changes in South Africa and the forthcoming transition in Hong Kong have encouraged high levels of investment and movement of funds. In 1992 and 1993 while delivering lectures in Switzerland and the USA I emphasised on several occasions that geo-political turbulence will affect the world financial systems. Even today few people really believe in this although the facts are there for all to see. In the winter and spring of 1995 the American dollar began to tumble against the Japanese yen. The world financial markets became very worried and the most prominent financial experts explained it away with the American budget deficit, the crisis of the Mexican peso or ambitions to increase American export. What really happened demonstrates the reduced abilities of governments and central banks to exercise effective control over international economic relations. Certain "invisible" private forces are already in control of the world economy and are rarely affected by governmental influence. Moreover, the first symptoms of uncotrollability appeared directly after the collapse of the Brenton Woods system at the beginning of the 1970's when in March 1973 Richard Nixon allowed the dollar to float. For almost a quarter of a century the dollar has been trying to find its levels via floating exchange rates and now we are on the eve of a new governmental vacuum. The reason for this is the constant increase in the role of the private banks and unidentified financial funds in global economics, the growth in the role of centrifugal effects in the world financial systems. In the spring of 1995 the director of the International Monetary Fund, M.Cammedessu, declared that in the near future and with its present structures the IMF would not be able to continue to fulfil its functions. "We are living in a dangerous world" were the words of Cammedessu. His trepidations were emphasised by the constant growth in unregulated funds of money as well as by the growing mountain of state and private debts etc.. Neither the present international financial system nor the entire world economic and political order will be able to prevent any possible crises. The chaos has affected the spiritual relations, thinking and value systems of people. The world communist movement underwent a catastrophe with negative repercussion for a number of other socialist and social democratic movements. On the other hand, the unpreparedness of the West to act quickly and the clear inadequacy of liberal doctrines to stop the crisis showed that they are unable to offer a miracle treatment. Many politicians in attempts to avoid divergence between reality and ideas have stated that it is no longer political programmes or ideologies which are important but pragmatic action. As in other similar historical transitional periods a large number of people are confused and prefer to take refuge in local pragmatism and finding solutions only to current problems. The lack of a common view about how one should approach the new situation has opened the door to nationalism, ethnic ambitions and xenophobia. A significant number of world politicians have been compelled to turn their attention to current problem solving and to ignore global and regional problems. It is becoming more and more evident that there is a need for a global analysis on what is taking place, its consequences and a search for a solution to the chaos which is ensuing. Today there is no doctrine or common theory about the future of the world, or how to solve our common problems: the global economic order, the environment, poverty, religious tolerance, stabilisation of growth etc.. This is one of the reasons why nationalism often comes to the fore in the search for solutions to global problems. The attitudes of the younger generations is a very important indication of the spiritual crisis. I often speak to my colleagues who are lecturers in various institutions of higher education in the industrialised countries of the world. In the less developed countries the situation is less clear. The young people in these countries want to achieve the material prosperity of the richest nations which is in itself strong motivation. In the USA, Japan, France, Great Britain, Canada and Germany, however, for quite a long time now, students and young people have no overall idea about their future. The ambition of achieving a certain level of material prosperity, a large bank account, one's own business, to travel abroad and so on, are largely manifestations of tradition rather than anything else. But what does this mean? Healthy interests and the stability of the system? Or, rather, a spiritual crisis in a vacuum expressed by the new generations in the most developed countries drowning in luxury and spiritual consumerism. World history has witnessed other periods of chaos and disorder of global structures: some longer some shorter. The problem is that the changes which are taking place today are not as the result of wars in which the victor imposes his will with force. The globalisation of the world has led to a universal crisis of the current world order. This is a crisis of the entire world system, of national and regional thinking and consequently everything else which typifies the Third Civilisation. Within global relations there is a new spiritual, economic and political vacuum. If these vacuums are not filled with adequate changes to world structures, there may be indescribable consequences. Why has there been such an explosion of religious sects in recent years? Why has terrorism become a global problem and is more and more uncompromising and violent in its forms? Why are people becoming more alienated from politics? Why has fundamentalism spread into new territories? Why has international crime grown so much? The reason is that the current world order is not adequate to respond to the new realities. NATO and the USA alone are not capable of resolving world conflicts. This may even lead to a reaction from Russia or China and new divisions within the world. The UN does not have the strength to stop conflicts. It is becoming apparent that many elements of the current world system are outdated and its major mechanisms have to be changed and repaired. The manifold lack of clarity in international political and economic relations are an expression of an inadequately low level of agreement between countries and the expectation that everything will resolve itself. The disorder is on such a large scale that it requires common action on the basis of universally accepted principles. Of course, the world today is much more integrated. This should not be seen so much as an advantage but as a condition for overcoming the chaos more rapidly and for allowing integration to develop. This will also require some form of world coordination, of mutually acceptable decisions and the growth in the role of organisations such as the UN. It would, however, be imprudent to suppose that the problems with which we are faced will be resolved quickly and conclusively. This will require a relatively longer period. The new world order will develop gradually, based on mutually agreeable action .This conclusion is based on the fact that the real world powers are still acting from their position as nation states and their national responsibilities and will only change the international rules of the game within that context. This is logical but it also carries a risk. Given a variety of events and varying conditions any one country with a more dominant global role by changing its internal order runs the risk of causing a universal cataclysm. Globalisation and its progeny - the global world, will lead to a crisis not only of traditional international relations but also of the political systems of national societies. The interests of more and more people stretch beyond the bounds of a single state and depend less and less on the decisions of a single government. Everywhere in the developed world there is a decline in trust for traditional political systems and a need for new decisions. Thus: 1. The lack of a mechanism for reliable international, economic and political regulations; 2. The contradiction between the unlimited global power of world corporations and the limited power of governmental decisions; 3. The reactions of 2.5-3 billion poor people in the unification of humanity into a single mutually dependent whole; 4. The danger of new nationalism and the restoration the division of the world into blocs; 5. The possibility of the bi-polar model being exchanged for a mono-centric world structure and the domination of one or a group of rich states; 6. The destruction of small cultures and the dilution of national traditions and values; 7. The limitation of the private life of the individual and his transformation into a "manipulated animal" by the new media; 8. The crisis of traditional political systems; 9. Terrorism and international crime; All this factors are expressions of the disorder and danger of chaos - an expression of the crisis of the borders between the two epochs. 2. GEOPOLITICAL COLLAPSE One of the most important consequences of the collapse of the Eastern European totalitarian regimes was the change in geo-political structures. The bi-polar world seems to have collapsed irreversibly. T he "modern" age which has occupied the last five centuries in the development of humanity has been a time of the creation and consolidation of nation states, of the formation of alliances and opposing political blocs. After the collapse of the Berlin wall a series of global processes began which were to lead to gradual but irreversible changes in the world political order. Directly after the fall of the"totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe the majority of political commentators and researchers considered that the problem would be limited to the collapse of the USSR and a number of smaller Eastern European states and thereafter their inclusion in the structures of the developed nations of NATO and the EU. Such one-sided views continue to predominate today, despite the fact that most people are aware of their inadequacies. The problem is that after the explosion in Eastern Europe a slow but unstoppable process of universal geopolitical change began. I refer to this process as "geo-political collapse", since it affected the political structures typical of the entire twentieth century and in a broader context, the entire Third Civilisation. What is clear is that the map of Europe is being reshaped. However, let us look at the rest of the world. Despite the strong influence of Russia in Central Asia there is a growing conflict of interests between a number of Islamic states and China. The unification of Germany has changed the proportionality of power in central Europe. There is no need for detailed forecasts in this area although there are certain clear trends emerging which seem to herald the end of the old world order. The first wave of the geo-political collapse clearly took place in Eastern Europe and most significantly in the USSR. The second will be connected with the increase in the political importance of Europe (above all Germany) and Japan. he role of the USA, the only remaining super power, will be to provide a balance with all the consequences which that entails. The third wave will be a consequence of the increase in the economic and the political importance of a number of smaller countries in South Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America. At the beginning of the 1990's we were witnesses not only to the collapse of the Eastern European political structures but also to the potential of profound changes within the West. There is no doubt that the borders of the European community will move towards the East and that the role of Germany in this process will be extremely significant. The consolidation of the European Union and the creation of a single European currency which appears to have strong political support[25] presuppose a number of changes in trans-Atlantic cooperation. I do not believe that trans-Atlantic ties will weaken but I do believe that the creation of a common European currency will bring about many changes in their nature, scale and direction. It is true that a large number of lesser developed states still do not have the self-confidence and strength to undertake independent activities. Even if this were to happen, such ideas would develop in isolation rather than as a part of a logical process. For the moment the countries outside the Group of 25 are strongly dependent on the most developed nations. Amongst them, however, there are a number of nations with growing ambitions for more economic and political influence. Which will be stronger? Integration or an eruption of ambitions and the struggle for new influence? The question is whether the struggle for free economic and political relations will begin in Asia, Africa or Latin America? Will this not be stronger than the processes of global integration? In any event one thing is clear - the old world order created between the 18th and 19th centuries by a group of advanced European states and the two super powers which emerged in the 20th century is now a thing of the past. The old geo-political world is collapsing before our eyes and not only as a consequence of the collapse of the USSR. In the autumn of 1995 the voters in Quebec very nearly voted for secession from Canada which could have lead to the real collapse of the Canadian state. Almost daily, politicians and civil servants in the European capital of Brussels reiterate the view that the USA should no longer play the role of a super power. In Paris the views are even more categorical. The state of chaos is due to the fact that the world is undergoing transition. There are many processes and situations within this transition as well as many unpredictable deviations. 3. ECONOMIC TURBULENCE Colossal disproportions have accumulated within the financial systems of the world. Until now they have not lead to any great crises because of the regulatory role played by the world political order. However, after its total collapse are we not bound to feel the cold embrace of instability and chaos? O n the 1st of September 1995 the world news agencies reported an emerging financial crisis in the most prosperous of post-war economies - Japan. Thousands of investors withdrew their deposits from the Kisu Credit Union in Osaka and the Hiogo bank in Kobe which were then closed to all kinds of banking operations. Their clients wanted to withdraw over 3 billion US dollars or almost 1/4 of the total deposits of the union. The bankruptcies of a number of Japanese credit unions and the unprecedented problems they caused for a number of large banks cast huge doubts about the stability of the banking system in Japan. The reason for such shocks is the huge amount of debt accumulated in the 1980's when stock exchange prices were very high and suddenly fell as a result of the global recession. The problem, however, is more complex. More and more people are becoming aware of the fact that the debts accumulated by governments and individual financial structures will not be repaid. The enormous debt of the American government and the increased indebtedness of other developed countries pose a question about the efficacy of the world financial system. It is true that in contrast to the Great Depression of the 1939, the banks and national governments now have much greater reserves and experience in avoiding financial crises. However, it is also true that such colossal debts are possible in the conditions of guaranteed political economic regulation and a clear and stable political order. The trust in the major currencies is based not only on their real condition but on their established monopoly of the world markets. It is not difficult to comprehend that if the geo-political restructuring does take place then political and military factors will lose their influence and the problem with debt will prove catastrophic. There is a direct link between the changes in world political structures and stability of the existing financial systems. Neither of them are adequate for the conditions of the epoch which we are now entering. Of course, the world economy will