s are a symbol not only of democracy but progress in general. I
believe in the truth of this argument but it is not so simple. Openness
which is inevitable and necessary means nothing in isolation from the
economic processes. Many underdeveloped, ex-colonial countries are both
absolutely open and absolutely poor. Progressive and stable openness comes
about as a result of economic and political progress, the attainment of a
certain level of economic balance. This is not a political whim but a result
from the accumulation and maturity of a given society.
We should not, therefore, be in a hurry to depose the role of the
nation states. They will not disappear overnight but will fade slowly in the
process of the development of relative economic balance. During the Third
Civilisation state power was absolute. During the Third Civilisation state
power was absolute. Ludwig 14th, Napoleon, Hitler, Mussolini, Lenin and
Stalin were themselves incorporations of the state. Today, however, this is
impossible. Dictators such as Idi Amin Dada in Uganda, Boccassa 1st in the
Central African Republic or Pol Pot in Cambodia have been condemned to
historical oblivion and hatred. However, many other democratically elected
government have felt obliged to "protect" the national output and to isolate
themselves with restrictive import duties and other protectionist barriers.
Those who feel threatened and isolated as a result of their backwardness
rather than integrated have to pay a high cost in terms of armies and
weapons.
Therefore in the under developed countries the nation state will
preserve its traditional functions for a relatively longer period of time.
This will be both natural and progressive if the relevant governments make
efforts to open and adapt their economies to the global market. Adversely,
their countries will continue to vegetate within the conditions of the Third
Civilisation and will begin to lag behind in universal world development.
This issue has another side to its. The movements towards world
openness and integration is a resource of progress. No government will
succeed in the modern world to integrate its people into processes of world
progress if it does not affiliate itself with the World Trade Organisation
and the international financial markets. The decline of the role of the
nation state is a universal process which is taking place more rapidly in
the developed countries and more slowly in those who are still aspiring to
become affiliated with them and slowest of all in those countries who feel
themselves obliged to defend their frail national identity. Nevertheless, no
one country will be able to ignore the common processes of the globalisation
of the world, markets, manufacturing and the media.
What then will become of the nation state and its power?
I believe that the main trends in world development will be as follows:
the role of the nation states will decline in significance whereas the
functions of the local institutions of authority and supra-national and
global coordinators will increase. This is taking place at the moment in
Europe and all other states whose governments are conceding more and more
power to the trans-national corporations, the world media networks or other
autonomous and influential non-governmental organisations. Louis d'Or 14th
in an expression of the absolute nature of power once said, "L'Etat -- c'est
moi". From the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th
century governments began grudgingly to concede part of their economic power
to the owners of large private enterprises. Now as a result of the
globalisation the national governments have no choice other than to give up
many of their prerogatives. This is a natural process which follows the
logic of world development. Many people find it difficult to understand and
regard national honour and pride as a priority and any suggestion to the
contrary provokes nationalistic reaction. There have always been such
governments and there, no doubt, will be for many decades to come. However,
such policies which seem to forget the need for global and humane
responsibility will lead nations into the back roads of development. Sooner
rather than later nations will realise that they have been deceived and will
seek recompense for the politicians who brought them to that state.
The borders of states in the transition to the Fourth Civilisation will
continue to narrow as a result of major technological and social changes. If
you remember the message of A.Toffler in chapter four of this book, he
predicted that the new technologies would transfer power both downwards to
the local institutions of authority and upwards to the global regulators and
the transnational corporations. On one hand many economic and social
functions will become much more effective if they are transferred from
governments to civil societies and are controlled by legislation. This is
the case with the planning and coordination of a series of macro and
micro-economic processes. This is also the case with social welfare and in
particular pension funds, health case and academic and scientific research.
ON the other hand national governments are not in a position to regulate
independently the global environment, world financial markets, the global
redistribution of resources, goods and services, information flow and the
media etc.. The more people, goods and services cross over national borders
the less significance these borders will have. This will in turn lead to
changes in the prerogatives of nation states.
At the end of the 20th century the state is too small an institution to
resolve global problems and too large to resolve its own local issues. This
is also a result of the new technology, the restructuring of manufacturing
and the market.
A typical example of such a bi-lateral change is offered by the member
countries of the European Union. According to some researchers since 1957
about half of the authority of the nation state has been transferred either
to local authority or to the European Commission in Brussels. This is
perhaps an isolated example of a regional alliance. However, the same
process seems to be taking place in the USA where the American political
system has been stretched vertically upwards by the transnational
corporations and financial markets and downwards by the individual states
and the non-governmental and private organisations. Bill Clinton would
hardly have the authority to implement such a wide ranging programme of
reform as the "New Deal" of President Roosevelt in the 1930's. Even in the
case of the states such as the USA national governments do not have the same
authority that they had 40 or 50 years ago. They have also taken upon
themselves a range of global responsibilities with which to compensate for
the decline authority and the transfer of the real power to the
trans-national corporations. The specific global role of the USA at the
beginning of the 1990's will soon have to be shared with others. It is not
fair on the American people to carry the huge burden of military
expenditure, the peace-keeping operations of the UN and so on. It will not
be long before they will also involve Russia, Japan and Europe (France and
Germany). IN this way the gradual decline in the significance of the nation
state is as true for the USA as it is for everywhere else.
A distinguishing feature of the modern nation state is its integration
and strong links with the civil society. A number of writers such as P.
Drucker and J. Lukac have written that the sovereign state will become just
one of a number of centres for identification and integration rather than
the only one and will coexist and compete with the trans-regional,
supra-national and local, even tribal structures. When this rule of logical
development is applied universally then nations attain a higher level of
enrichment. Switzerland, for example, leads all statistical classifications
on the basis of GDP per head of population and this is not only due to the
success of the Swiss banks. This is rather a result of the co-existence of
the trans-national corporations and the banks, strong local authorities and
the state (government and parliament) which fulfils the role of a bridge
between the two sectors. The lack of bureaucracy, the active role of the
local population in global business and the decision making processes is a
particulary strong feature of the Swiss political system.
The modern state will have less and less international authority.
Globalisation opens borders and the world market "erodes" sovereignty. By
transferring their authority to the new global leaders and to local leaders
the national governments will have less and less capabilities. This,
however, raises the issue of the preservation of the identity of nations and
states in the face of the emergent global culture and global awareness. It
is the "travelling peoples" which will succeed with their sustainable and
strong cultural links which not only produce avant garde technology but use
it to effect. It is not states and weapons but technological power plus
knowledge which will play a decisive role in this question.
4. AFTER THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL IDENTITY
The modern-day left is like the right undressed and the modern-day
right is like a well dressed left.
(political jokes from the end of the 20th century)
A
lthough I frequently speak of the Fourth Civilisation, the new
ideological and theoretical synthesis and balanced development I realize how
difficult it is for these new concepts to be accepted by the modern world.
This is particularly true for the smaller (albeit proud) countries such as
Bulgaria. In face of the new global changes and challenges there is no
difference between the small and the large countries. We are all part of the
same game. Some are quicker while some are slower but we are all undergoing
the same profound changes. In Eastern Europe three years were sufficient to
understand the crisis of universal political identity which the West has
long been aware of.
For more than 100 years the political left in the world has been
associated with the new role of the working class, social guarantees,
nationalisation of the basic means of production and the expropriation from
the expropriators etc.. The right has always been linked with the defence of
large and medium scale private capital, traditions and security, no state
intervention in business and non-involvement in social matters. However, in
the modern world at the end of the 20th century, with the exception of a few
fringe parties and movements, there is no country or political party in the
world which resembles these traditional concepts of the left and right.
Together with the collapse of the Third Civilisation we are also
experiencing a crisis of political identity. This is a consequence of the
new ideological and theoretical synthesis, the changes in ownership and the
social and class structure as well as the end of the traditional state
mechanisms. The object of the differences between the left and the right is
disappearing. The entire world is undergoing a process of ownership
socialisation and states are being integrated into civil societies in which
neither the old left nor the old right can preserve their traditional
status.
During the present time of chaos and the growing mistrust towards the
traditional leaders, of left-wing promises made by right-wing politicians
and the concern of the business sector for social issues we should expect
too much. The political inertia is very strong and only a minority would
take the electoral risk of trying to overthrow the traditional symbols. What
we are witness to at the moment is the adaptation of the old phraseology to
new world realities. Whether they want it or not the left and the right wing
parties in the world are intuitively moving towards a state of "balanced
development" and will fight for domination of its ideological territory. The
"left" no longer reject the concept of private capital and do not demand
nationalisation. The "right" are no longer ashamed to speak of social
programmes and the needs of the poor. The borders between the traditional
electorates are fading as a result of a process of irreversible changes in
the social and class structure of society.
As a consequence many new parties have appeared which give voice to
localised interests within a given country or region. The "success" of Ross
Perot at the presidential elections in 1992 and national independence
parties in Canada or Catalonia and Northern Italy are features of the same
phenomenon: the change in the foundations and structures and economic and
social interests is leading to changes in political doctrines and political
parties. The traditional parties which succeed in making the transition and
re-orientate themselves rapidly within the complex situation of the modern
world will survive and their traditional names will be no more than a mere
decoration. Those who delay will fade away and gradually open the way to the
new political formations.
The end of the crisis of modern political identity will come quite
quickly. Many of the parties of the Socialist and Liberal Internationals or
Christian Democratic parties are making timid steps towards changes in their
programmes. Some of them are rejecting their traditional programmes outright
with the justification of the need for a new pragmatism. The former
communist parties of Eastern Europe changed their names to "socialist" or
"social-democratic". Some of them have become so closely associated with
large-scale capital that they already resemble the bourgeois parties of end
of the 19th century.
Together with the changes in ownership and the social and class
structure, as well as the new borders of the nation state and the transition
to global polycentrism, the changes in modern political parties and
doctrines is another important feature of the changes in world civilisation.
The rapprochement between party programmes and views which is taking place
at the moment is a consequence of the new ideological synthesis. It will not
be long before political pluralism will take its stand on the new problems
of the Fourth Civilisation and the transition to it.
There are two further processes linked with the problem of political
identity which I would like to mention. The first of these is linked with
the obvious need for regional and trans-national political formations such
as the Party of European Socialists, for example. The second is the need for
new types of voting systems and the development of direct democracy. My
friend the American political scientist Theodore Becker refers to this as
"teledemocracy". The world telecommunication systems such as the Internet
provide wonderful opportunities for the direct involvement of millions and
billions of people in the decision-taking processes. Today, there are very
few politicians who are aware of this, a few others are sceptical and
concerned about preserving their own power and forces of manipulation.
For me there is little doubt that the Fourth Civilisation will lead to
enormous changes in political life and its structures, types of government,
electoral mechanisms and decision taking. These are not utopias, nor are
they long-term forecasts. These are simply the results of something which is
appearing before out very eyes.
5. THE GLOBAL COORDINATORS
The Fourth Civilisation will be at one and the same time an open,
polycentric and integrated world. This will require a more effective system
of global coordination.
W
hen analysing the system of the Fourth Civilisation, I naturally came
upon the problem of global coordination. This once again brought to my mind
the unsystematic but indicative thoughts of Lenin on the "single factory for
all workers and peasants", Stalin's idea of the "world wide victory of
communism", Hitler's thoughts on the "World Reich" and Fukoyama's writings
on the "End of History" etc.. A great number of researchers from the World
Federation for Future Studies have also written on the need for a world
government.
There is clearly some logic to this argument. Globalisation will
require much more than ever before increased global control. As the
processes develop and political polycentrism increases there will be a
growing need for world coordination. Nevertheless, I do not believe that it
will be possible in the near future to establish such a global government.
This is an element of the distant future to which neither I nor my
generation belong. Of course, the Fourth Civilisation will cover the entire
period of the 21st century and no doubt future generations of our
grandchildren and great-grand children will have to face the issue.
Today the world is faced with hundreds of global problems which lead to
collapse of the bi-polar world structures. There are a number of world
organisations involved in these problems such as the UN, the World Trade
Organisation and the IMF based on the need for compromises between nation
states and their products. Since compromise between nation states is at the
basis of the development of the world organisations their capabilities to
act in the real conditions of the modern world are seriously restricted. If
we want the world organisations to succeed, they will have to receive wide
empowerment and responsibilities for the global problems which are outside
the domain of nation states. This is the only way in which a united world of
small and large states and cultures will be able to face up to the
challenges of supra-national environmental interests. It is, of course,
absurd to speak of a world government, but it is clear that there is an
obvious need for a coordinating body which from the very outset will be able
to resolve military and ecological crises, regulate the conditions for world
finance and the fight against international crime etc..
It is, therefore, evident that the modern world needs a revision of the
Constitution of the United Nations and the expansion of the powers of the
Security Council as well as the establishment of new institutions. Many of
these have already been proposed by a number of leading world politicians
and intellectuals. These include the Council for Ecological Security of the
United Nations. A reflection of the new directions in thought are the new
structures within the United Nations and its specialised organisations
including UNESCO, INIDO, FAO and others.
This process of expansion has to be carried out very carefully with the
gradual empowerment of specialised national organisations with the rights
and responsibilities currently born by nation states. I expect that the main
priority will be global economic control and the resolution of global
environmental and social issues. The restructuring of the UN, the creation
of an effective World Bank, the increase in the prerogatives of the World
Trade Organisation and the empowerment of all these organisations to deal
with the real problems of the world is the path to balanced development.
This path will be difficult, slow and gradual but there is no other way. The
alternative is for the new communications, computers and automated factories
to dig a deeper gorge between the poor and the rich rather than a source for
democracy and freedom.
At the same time the large nations have to double and treble their
efforts to create a new climate in the world and another type of global
intercourse. This may lead to the institutionalisation of the meetings of
the G-7 and its expansion to include Russia and China and perhaps a few
other nations. It may be a good idea to hold regular meetings of the heads
of state of the whole world. There are a number of possibilities. The most
important thing is for us to realise that the new age which we are entering
requires new type of thinking and a new understanding of our own
responsibilities.
THE NATIONS WHICH WILL SUCCEED, THE NATIONS OF THE FOURTH CIVILISATION
(instead of a conclusion)
T
his book is an expression of my inner spiritual world and my thoughts
over a number of years on the present state and the potential future of our
confused world. I have been profoundly influenced by the major political
changes which have taken place since the collapse of the Eastern European
political systems and their economic structures. I am acutely aware that the
"Fourth Civilisation" will provoke a number of different reactions. During
such a watershed period in our history unanimity is dangerous and
unnecessary. Indeed, the book which I have written contains a number of
generalisations on the character of global change at the border between two
millennia, the periodisation of history and the crisis of the entire modern
civilisation. The logic of my research has lead me to a number of
conclusions on the new geo-political nature of the world and the necessity
of global economic and political regulation.
The "Fourth Civilisation" is not based on abstract proposals or
invented eloquent phrases. All my conclusions are based on experience and
suffering, on years of research and reading as well as specific practical,
academic experiments and political experience. The "Fourth Civilisation" is
not a forecast, nor futuristic literature but an evaluation of the facts as
they are. It is an attempt to overcome the academic dogma of the 19th
century which have existed for over 150 years. I am interested in the clash
of ideas and I realise that many of my conclusions merit further analysis,
something which I intend to do in the future. I can now see with delight
many new areas for creative work.
The "Fourth Civilisation" is not intended to reveal all the details of
the issues which it raises but to unify them within one general concept and
to reveal the universal character of the global change which the modern
world in experiencing. The common crisis of the bi-polar world and the
collapse of the Eastern European regimes, the modern conditions of
geo-political chaos in which we are living, the major re-structuring of the
world economy, culture and politics shows that the new realities with which
we are faced have a complex and accumulative effect. Whether we want to or
not, they will lead us to new solutions. My book is concerned with these
solutions and the new methodological approach to the evaluation of world
processes. It is also concerned with the changes in ownership, political and
economic structures and the way in which they are finding more and more
common global ground. I realise that these conclusions may be quite
controversial but I deeply believe in them as indicative proof. Everything
which proves that the old civilisation is fading and that we are entering
into a new Fourth Civilisation is based on the trends and processes to which
we are already witnesses.
I have to confess that everything which I have touched upon in this
book is a starting point for further work based on the country in which I
was born and bred. Bulgaria is now undergoing a difficult and complex crisis
caused by the transition from a totalitarian to a market and pluralist
economy. I have spoken little about Bulgaria in the "Fourth Civilisation"
but in actual fact all my conclusions concern its fate. I believe that I
have been right to keep my conclusions about Bulgaria to a separate book.
This has allowed my to concentrate on the features of global change and to
concentrate on the specific features of Bulgaria at a later stage. For this
reason there is a direct and unifying link between the "Fourth Civilisation"
and my book about Bulgaria which is soon to be published. I hope that they
will both be of interest to all my friends with whom for over ten years now
we have been discussing the fate of the changes and all my colleagues all
over the world with whom I have argued about the future of our world and all
those people with whom I have shared the good and the bad in the political
life of Bulgaria over the past seven years.
Whatever the fate of this book, on completing it I want to thank all
those without whom it would not have been possible. I owe so much to my
mother and my father who bore me and brought me up, my family who have
suffered the deprivations of my almost permanent preoccupation with work, my
teachers from whom I learnt so much, and my colleagues and my friends who
helped me with the book. Nothing in this life can be achieved without love
and I thank all those who believed in me since it was their faith, hoe and
love which inspired so much of my conclusions.
During the entire period of writing and preparing the "Fourth
Civilisation" I asked myself the question, "Which nations will succeed and
will not be lost to the chaos of the global world?". During the great
migrations of the Second Civilisation many nations and ethnic groups lost
their potential and remained on the periphery of the nation states which
were to emerge later. Some of them have disappeared. I hope fervently that
the Bulgarian spirit is not lost and that it does not become dissolved in
the waves of migration of people, information and goods which is on the
horizon. I shall work and I shall struggle for this not to the detriment of
any other nation. I shall work to consolidate the culture and the economy of
Bulgaria in the context of dignified competition.
The nations which will succeed do not live only in the great countries.
These will be the nations which will accept the laws of the new age and will
become the people of the Fourth Civilisation. These nations will not be
divided on the lines of capitalist or socialist, workers or bourgeois,
imperialist or colonial. These peoples will not allow their civic freedoms
to be usurped nor will they recognise cultural or political isolationism and
closed economies. The nations of the Fourth Civilisation will be united with
millions and billions of visible and invisible threads. They will produce
the new values which belong to the whole of humanity.
The road is long and there will be many storms along the way. The New
Civilisation does not require social engineering it requires merely the
pursuance of the logic of progress which our fathers and the outgoing 20th
century have bequeathed to us. It is a difficult but glorious legacy, a
legacy which will require us to be true to our time and those who will come
after us.
Sofia 1996.
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