meshayut, ne zhelayut videt' vozrozhdennuyu i uverennuyu, samostoyatel'nuyu Rossiyu i ne skryvayut pri etom otkrovennogo zhelaniya podchinit' bogatstva novyh rossijskih sobstvennikov interesam razvitiya ekonomiki svoih stran. Moj horoshij znakomyj, redaktor zhurnala "Forbs" Piter Furmann v odnoj iz besed obmolvilsya (i dovol'no interesno otrazil eto v yanvarskom nomere svoego zhurnala za 1995 god), chto k ekonomicheskomu proniknoveniyu v Rossiyu oni stali gotovit'sya srazu zhe s 1985 goda. Ne potomu li vsem nam inogda ochen' trudno? Net nikakogo somneniya v tom, chto sobstvennye special'nye struktury amerikanskih korporacij, tesno vzaimodejstvuya s gosudarstvennymi, "osvoili" rossijskij rynok. Po mneniyu amerikancev, v Rossii segodnya net sistemy obnaruzheniya programm ser'eznyh protivnikov, ravno kak i sistemy planirovaniya i osushchestvleniya mer protivodejstviya etim programmam. Vo vremena SSSR sistema provedeniya takih operacij byla zhestko centralizovana. Ona byla nepovorotliva, no, imenno buduchi sistemoj, v celom ne mogla sdelat' ni odnogo nezashchishchennogo shaga. Odin iz amerikanskih istochnikov sravnil ee s neuklyuzhim, no bronirovannym so vseh storon rycarem. Sejchas zhe, posle razvala SSSR, staraya sistema okazalas' rastashchennoj na kuski. Upomyanutyj istochnik skazal (pochti doslovno): "Russkie polagayut, chto oni nadeli na tu ruku, kotoroj oni neposredstvenno vedut boj, rycarskuyu perchatku - i etogo im vpolne dostatochno. Odnako oni ne ponimayut, chto k nim mozhno nezametno podkrast'sya szadi, i togda perchatka ne spaset". "Imeyushchiesya u rossijskogo biznesa sluzhby bezopasnosti effektivny tol'ko protiv primitivnogo reketa; oni sposobny takzhe sozdavat' sobstvennyh "agentov vliyaniya" v rossijskih gosuchrezhdeniyah, no ne bolee. Obrazno govorya, eti sluzhby bezopasnosti - sobstvennaya "miliciya" rossijskogo biznesa. Neobhodimost' takogo roda sluzhb rossijskie kompanii ponyali. No neobhodimost' "sobstvennoj razvedki" eshche ne osoznali. Bolee togo, rukovoditeli rossijskih kompanij poka ne ponimayut raznicy mezhdu "miliciej" i "razvedkoj", i iskrenne polagayut, chto eto odno i to zhe". *** Vse moi somneniya v spravedlivosti ispytyvaemyh opasenij razveyal ni kto inoj, kak sam prezident SSHA Bill Klinton. V svoem vystuplenii na soveshchanii v Ob®edinennom komitete nachal'nikov shtabov 24 oktyabrya 1995 goda on zayavil: "Poslednie desyat' let politika v otnoshenii SSSR i ego soyuznikov ubeditel'no dokazala pravil'nost' vzyatogo nami kursa na ustranenie odnoj iz sil'nejshih derzhav mira, a takzhe sil'nejshego voennogo bloka. Ispol'zuya promahi sovetskoj diplomatii, chrezvychajnuyu samonadeyannost' Gorbacheva i ego okruzheniya, v tom chisle i teh, kto otkrovenno zanyal proamerikanskuyu poziciyu, my dobilis' togo, chto sobiralsya sdelat' Trumen s Sovetskim Soyuzom posredstvom atomnoj bomby. Pravda, s odnim sushchestvennym otlichiem - my poluchili syr'evoj pridatok, ne razrushennoe atomom gosudarstvo, kotoroe bylo by nelegko sozdavat'. Da, my zatratili na eto milliardy dollarov, a oni uzhe sejchas blizki k tomu, chto u russkih nazyvaetsya samookupaemost'yu. Za chetyre goda my i nashi soyuzniki poluchili razlichnogo strategicheskogo syr'ya na 15 milliardov dollarov, sotni tonn zolota, dragocennyh kamnej i t.d. V gody tak nazyvaemoj perestrojki v SSSR mnogie nashi voennye i biznesmeny ne verili v uspeh predstoyashchih operacij. I naprasno. Rasshatav ideologicheskie osnovy SSSR, my sumeli beskrovno vyvesti iz vojny za mirovoe gospodstvo gosudarstvo, sostavlyayushchee osnovnuyu konkurenciyu Amerike. Nasha cel' i zadacha i v dal'nejshem okazyvat' pomoshch' vsem, kto hochet videt' v nas obrazec zapadnoj svobody i demokratii. Kogda v nachale 1991 goda rabotniki CRU peredali na Vostok dlya osushchestvleniya nashih planov 50 millionov dollarov, a zatem eshche takie zhe summy, mnogie iz politikov, voennye takzhe ne verili v uspeh dela. Teper' zhe, po proshestvii chetyreh let, vidno - plany nashi nachali realizovyvat'sya. Odnako eto eshche ne znachit, chto nam ne nad chem dumat'. V Rossii, strane, gde eshche ne dostatochno sil'no vliyanie SSHA, neobhodimo reshit' odnovremenno neskol'ko zadach: - vsyacheski starat'sya ne dopustit' k vlasti kommunistov. Pri pomoshchi nashih druzej sozdat' takie predposylki, chtoby v parlamentskoj gonke byli postavleny vse myslimye i nemyslimye prepony dlya levyh partij; - osobennoe vnimanie udelit' prezidentskim vyboram. Nyneshnee rukovodstvo strany nas ustraivaet vo vseh otnosheniyah. I potomu nel'zya skupit'sya na rashody. Oni prinesut svoi polozhitel'nye rezul'taty. Obespechiv zanyatie El'cinym posta prezidenta na vtoroj srok, my tem samym sozdadim poligon, s kotorogo uzhe nikogda ne ujdem. Dlya resheniya dvuh vazhnyh politicheskih momentov neobhodimo sdelat' tak, chtoby iz prezidentskogo okruzheniya El'cina ushli te, kto skomprometiroval sebya. I dazhe neznachitel'noe "polevenie" nyneshnego prezidenta ne oznachaet dlya nas porazheniya. |to budet lish' lovkim politicheskim tryukom. Cel' opravdyvaet sredstva. Esli nami budut resheny eti dve zadachi, to v blizhajshee desyatiletie predstoit reshenie sleduyushchih problem: - raschlenenie Rossii na melkie gosudarstva putem mezhregional'nyh vojn, podobnyh tem, chto byli organizovany nami v YUgoslavii; - okonchatel'nyj razval voenno-promyshlennogo kompleksa Rossii i armii; - ustanovlenie rezhimov v otorvavshihsya ot Rossii respublikah nuzhnyh nam. Da, my pozvolili Rossii byt' derzhavoj, no imperiej budet tol'ko odna strana - SSHA". U menya mnogo druzej sredi amerikancev, no ya ne dumayu, chto kto-libo iz nih ostalsya by dovolen, esli by kto-nibud' iz rukovoditelej Rossii pozvolil sebe podobnoe. *** Vse perezhitoe v tesnom perepletenii s sobytiyami segodnyashnego dnya pobuzhdaet k razmyshleniyam. Vechera, kak pravilo, teper' provozhu doma, sidya v kresle, pered televizorom ili s knigoj v rukah. Na polu, rastyanuvshis' poperek komnaty, u nog lezhit svoenravnaya krasavica Ajza, kavkazskaya ovcharka, kotoruyu inogda nazyvaem upryamoj chechenkoj. Ne obizhaetsya. (K nashemu bol'shomu sozhaleniyu, rotvejler Vil'ma umerla dva goda nazad). Vchera vecherom v kotoryj raz raskryl tomik velikogo G.Gejne na nemeckom yazyke. Mne byli ponyatny perezhivaniya francuzskogo grenadera-barabanshchika Le Granda, protknuvshego shpagoj staryj voennyj baraban posle vozvrashcheniya iz plena i krusheniya idealov. No ya ne francuz. Mne uzhe mnogo let. Za plechami zhizn'. Za plechami moej strany - tysyacheletie. YA russkij. So vremen skifov my byli doverchivy, gostepriimny, no ne lyubili, chtoby nas stavili na koleni. My ochen' terpelivy, no ne daj bog peregnut'... *** Inogda ya proezzhayu po kol'cevoj moskovskoj doroge mimo uchastka, gde raspolagaetsya kompleks zdanij razvedki. I kazhdyj raz ya blagodaren sud'be za to, chto mne bylo dano pravo byt' oficerom razvedki. Moskva iyul' 1994 - oktyabr' 1998 PRILOZHENIYA 1992 JOINT MILITARY NET ASSESSEMENT CHAPTER 11 SPECIAL INTEREST AREAS Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Warning Intelligence The steps taken by CIS leaders to reform fundamental political, security, and economic institutions in the aftermath of the failed Moscow coup promise a new phase in global relations. Before this development in the former Soviet Union, the intelligence efforts of both East and West had continued with relatively modest changes. However, despite statements by CIS leaders about dismantling their intelligence structures and subjecting their intelligence organizations to greater public scrunity, a huge collection apparatus remains available to the political entity assuming power. Whatever intelligence services emerge from the current upheaval will most likely continue to collect against traditional military and political targets (albeit an a lower level), while redirecting their efforts to Third World security issues and economic and commercial objectives. A number of former Soviet clients states and developing countries pose effective, regionally oriented, and frequently multi-disciplined intelligence threats. Although these countries' capabilities are often technologically inferior tocounterintelligence systems of the developed West, their capabilities will improve as enhanced collection systems are developed or acquired. DOD counterdrug operations present an additional target of opportunity for counterintelligence by states or groups. Secure communications and other operations security measures will remain important for effective counterdrug operations. Counterintelligence In the post-Cold War era, the increase in personal, technical, and commercial contacts among nations has broadened substantially the opportunities for overt collection of sensitive information. Conversely, former adversaries face difficult challenges because of butgeoning East-West relations and commercial ventures, intrusive arms-control inspections, loss of internal controls and restrictions, defectors and emeigres from the East, and "volunteers" spies for the West. Little change in extant organizational structures and bilateral relationships among the Western democracies in expected, but dissipating peerceptions of remaining military threats are likely to reduce investment in counterintelligence functions. However, the potential for divergent economic interests resulting from increased global conpetitiveness may elevate the potential for intelligence threats, even from traditional allies. Thus, the United States probably will continue to experience espionage damage to plans, programs, operations, and technological advantages. Changing intelligence relationships with allies and expected cooperation with traditional adversaries pose intelligence risks. Lack of language capabilities, unfamiliarity with the lical environment, and a lack of prior relationship with indegenous counterintelligence and security services hinder the capabilities of US counterintelligence personnel deployed to nontraditional assigment lications. Warning Overall US intelligence capabilities are assessed to be good to excellent in proving information on changes in the military capabilities of potential adversaries. This military data, analyzed in the context of early political and economic indicators of an increased threat to the United States or its interests, provides the dasis for warning time assumptions. Reliably determining an adversary's exact intent remains elusive, but it is nevertheless a goal of the warning process. Warning of a specific time of attack based on military capabilities is unrealistic, as essential final political decisions are invariably the denermining factor. The future of US warning capabilities will be dependent on a number of factors. Resource constraints and personnel reductions in the Intelligence Community will have a negative effect, but the reduction in the forward presence of US forces-inevitable as the global security environment changes- will have the greatest impact on our ability to obtain timely warning of changes in the capabilities of potential adversaries. OBLASTX SPECIALXNYH INTERESOV Razvedka, kontrrazvedka i sistema preduprezhdeniya Razvedka Predprinyatye rukovoditelyami SNG shagi po korennomu reformirovaniyu posle provala v Moskve popytki gosudarstvennogo perevorota politicheskih, ekonomicheskih uchrezhdenij i special'nyh sluzhb svidetel'stvuyut o novoj faze v global'nyh otnosheniyah. Pered etim povorotom obstanovki v byvshem Sovetskom Soyuze razvedyvatel'nye usiliya kak Vostoka, tak i Zapada prodolzhalis' s neznachitel'nymi, skromnymi izmeneniyami. Tem ne menee, nesmotrya na zayavleniya rukovoditelej SNG o demontazhe iz razvedyvatel'nyh struktur i vvedenii bol'shego obshchestvennogo kontrolya za razvedyvatel'nymi organizaciyami, ogromnyj apparat sbora informacii ostaetsya v rasporyazhenii politicheskih grupp, prihodyashchih k vlasti. Kakaya by razvedyvatel'naya sluzhba ne poyavilas' iz segodnyashnego besporyadka, ona skoree vsego prodolzhit sbor informacii v otnoshenii tradicionnyh voennyh i politicheskih ob®ektov (hotya i na bolee nizkom urovne), perenacelivaya svoi usiliya na voprosy bezopasnosti v Tret'em mire i kommercheskuyu informaciyu. Ryad stran-klientov byvshego Sovetskogo Soyuza i razvivayushchiesya strany predstavlyayut iz sebya effektivnuyu, orientirovannuyu na regiony i chasto ves'ma disciplinirovannuyu razvedyvatel'nuyu ugrozu. Hotya potencial etih stran v tehnicheskom plane ne mozhet sostyazat'sya s kontrrazvedyvatel'nymi sistemami, razrabotannymi Zapadom, ih vozmozhnosti budut rasti po mere togo, kak budut razvivat'sya ili stanovit'sya neobhodimymi uluchshennye sistemy sbora informacii. Operacii Ministerstva oborony protiv rasprostraneniya narkotikov predstavlyayut soboj dopolnitel'nyj ob®ekt kontrrazvedyvatel'nyh sluzhb gosudarstv ili otdel'nyh sluzhb. Zashchishchennye linii svyazi i meropriyatiya po obespecheniyu bezopasnosti drugih operacij budut imet' znachenie dlya effektivnogo osushchestvleniya bor'by s narkotikami. Kontrrazvedka Posle "holodnoj vojny" rost kontaktov mezhdu chastnymi grazhdanami raznyh stran, a takzhe po linii kommercii i tehniki znachitel'no rasshiril vozmozhnosti dlya otkrytogo sbora ser'eznoj informacii. I naoborot, byvshie protivniki stolknulis' s problemami v svyazi s rascvetom otnoshenij mezhdu Vostokom i Zapadom i sovmestnyh predpriyatij, provedeniem kontrol'nyh inspekcij na mestah v ramkah soglashenij po sokrashcheniyu vooruzhenij, utratoj kontrolya za vnutrennej obstanovkoj i otmenoj ogranichenij, v svyazi s predatel'stvami i vyezdami emigrantov s Vostoka, a takzhe iz-za "dobrovol'nyh" shpionov s Zapada. Ozhidaetsya, chto v ostayushchihsya organizacionnyh strukturah i dvustoronnih otnosheniyah mezhdu zapadnymi demokratiyami proizojdut neznachitel'nye izmeneniya, odnako rasseivayushcheesya ozhidanie vozmozhnoj voennoj ugrozy skoree vsego privedet k snizheniyu finansirovaniya kontrrazvedyvatel'nyh funkcij. Odnako potencial razlichiya ekonomicheskih interesov, proistekayushchij ot rosta global'noj konkurentnoj bor'by, sposoben sozdat' ugrozu aktivizacii razvedyvatel'noj deyatel'nosti, v tom chisle so storony tradicionnyh soyuznikov. Takim obrazom, Soedinennye SHtaty, ochevidno, budut prodolzhat' nesti poteri ot shpionazha, teryaya preimushchestva svoih planov, programm, operacij i tehnologij. Izmeneniya v sootnosheniyah s soyuznikami i ozhidaemoe sotrudnichestvo s tradicionnymi protivnikami v oblasti razvedyvatel'noj deyatel'nosti predstavlyayut soboj opredelennyj risk. Nedostatok specialistov s sootvetstvuyushchimi yazykami, neznanie mestnoj obstanovki i otsutstvie predshestvovavshih vzaimootnoshenij s mestnymi kontrrazvedyvatel'nymi i razvedyvatel'nymi sluzhbami podryvayut sposobnost' amerikanskih kontrrazvedyvatel'nyh organizacij, reshayushchih svoi zadachi v neobychnyh dlya nih usloviyah. Preduprezhdenie V celom effektivnost' razvedki SSHA ocenivaetsya kak horoshaya ili prekrasnaya v plane dobyvaniya informacii ob izmeneniyah v voennom potenciale vozmozhnyh protivnikov. |ta voennaya informaciya, analiziruemaya pod uglom zreniya vyyavleniya na rannej stadii politicheskih i ekonomicheskih priznakov rastushchej ugrozy Soedinennym SHtatam ili ih interesam, sostavlyayut osnovu dlya prognozov v plane predvaritel'nogo opoveshcheniya. Dostovernoe opredelenie tochnyh namerenij protivnika predstavlyaetsya zatrudnitel'nym, odnako imenno eto yavlyaetsya cel'yu processa predvaritel'nogo opoveshcheniya. Delat' preduprezhdenie o konkretnom vremeni napadeniya tol'ko na osnove analiza voennogo potenciala ne yavlyaetsya realistichnym, opredelyayushchim faktorom pri etom yavlyaetsya prinyatie okonchatel'nyh politicheskih reshenij. HERBERT APTHEKER. Imperialism's Intelligence (Political Affairs). Colonel Corson, the author, comments on the Doolittle matter: "By accepting the Doolittle report Eisenhower not only embraced the idea that there was no Geneva convention to guide American conduct, but also communicated to the intelligence community from Akron to Afganistan that he was amenable to a no-holds-barred approach on their part." Less than a year later the Doolittle Report became formal U.S. policy through the adoption of National Security Council directive 5412/1, issued March 12, 1955. The essence of that directive lies in its six authorization paragraphs directed to the CIA; the latter was told to do the following (we are quoting): 1) Create and exploit problems for international communism. 2) Discredit international communism, and reduce the strength of its parties and organization. 3) Reduce international communist control over any areas of the world. 4) Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the nations of the free world... increase the capacity and will of such peoples and nations to resist international communism. 5) In accordance with established principles, and to the extent practicable in areas dominated or threatened by international communism, develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla operations. 6) Specifically, such operations shall include and covert activities related to: propaganda, political action, economic warfare, preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition, escape and evasion and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile stated or groups including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, support of indigenous and anticommunist elements in threatened countries of the free worls; deception plans and operations and all compatible activities necessary to accomplish the foregoing. The fact is, writes the author, that the CIA wanted "to finish the job of the Soviet Union started by Hitler." Meanwhile, by CIA of Hitlerian methods, progressive governments were overthrown in Iraq an Guatemala and the Dominican Republic and Guyana, the invasion of Cuba was undertaken and since then programs like Mongoose have subsidized sabotage, murder and - the author tells us - at least eight different attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro. Other murder efforts, including one aimed at Chou En-Laiaome twenty years ago, failed, while that against Lumumba succeeded. The author sugggests that it is possible some of these murder efforts were not known to the President but he is sure Rockefeller was in on the secrets. He suggests also that there is evidence that CIA operations have degenerated in terms of responsibility; he cites, for example: "President Carter's admission that he didn't know that King Hussein of Jordan was on his (the CIA) persolak payroll." Beginning in 1948, the Colonel notes, "The CIA's Office of Policy Coordination and the Deputy Director for Plans had been engaged, without much success, in inserting agents provocateurs into Eastern European satellite countries for low-level espionage and sabotage purpose'. By the 1950s these efforts had been sophisticated and develiped into full-scale secret wars - code named Red Sox/Red Cap - having as their essential purpose the provocation of uprisings especially in Hungary, Poland an Czechoslovakia. In this period so-called defectors from these countries as well as from Rumania "were trained to become the CIA'a entry into anti-Soviet struggles" with most of this training being done in West Germany. Considerable detail - some of it new - if offered in this volume on the significant role of the CIA in the Hungarian events of 1956; the author makes explicit that the purpose at that time was the complete overthrow of the system of socialism and the restoration of the situation that prevailed prior to World War II. This will make instructive reading for those souls who insisted that the aim of that 1956 counterrevolutionary move was socialism's "purification". "Polkovnik Korson, kommentiruya predlozheniya Dulitla (o formah i metodah bor'by protiv SSSR - Dr.), otmechaet, chto |jzenhauer, soglasivshis' s polozheniyami doklada, ne tol'ko prishel k vyvodam, chto amerikancy v svoih dejstviyah vryad li dolzhny strogo rukovodstvovat'sya polozheniyami ZHenevskoj konvencii, no i obratilsya k predstavitelyam razvedyvatel'nogo soobshchestva za rubezhom, vyskazav svoe ubezhdenie v tom, chto podhod k ih deyatel'nosti ne dolzhen imet' elementy chisto zapretitel'nogo haraktera (t.e. razresheny lyubye dejstviya -Dr.). Menee chem cherez god Doklad Dulitla leg v osnovu oficial'noj amerikanskoj politiki, projdya stadiyu transformacii v direktivu Soveta Nacional'noj bezopasnosti N 5412/1 ot 12 marta 1955 goda. Sut' direktivy, kotoroj dolzhno bylo rukovodstvovat'sya Central'noe razvedyvatel'noe upravlenie SSHA, svodilas' k shesti osnovnym paragrafam, opredelyayushchim glavnye napravleniya raboty: -sozdavat' problemy v mezhdunarodnom kommunisticheskom dvizhenii i ispol'zovat' ih v svoih celyah; -diskreditirovat' mezhdunarodnoe kommunisticheskoe dvizhenie, snizhat' silu vliyaniya kommunisticheskih partij i organizacij; -snizhat' stepen' vliyaniya i kontrolya mezhdunarodnogo kommunizma na otdel'nye regiony i strany mira; -ukreplyat' orientaciyu na Soedinennye SHtaty gosudarstv svobodnogo mira, usilivat' potencial i zhelanie narodov etih stran protivostoyat' mezhdunarodnomu kommunizmu; -v sootvetstvii s ustanovivshimisya principami i sushchestvuyushchej praktikoj v regionah, kontroliruemyh ili podvergaemyh ugroze rasprostraneniya, mezhdunarodnogo kommunizma, razvivat' podpol'noe dvizhenie soprotivleniya i usilivat' tajnye operacii i partizanskie dejstviya; -v chastnosti takaya deyatel'nost' dolzhna vklyuchat' v sebya tajnye operacii, otnosyashchiesya k voprosam propagandy, vedeniyu politicheskoj deyatel'nosti, podryvu ekonomiki, preventivnym pryamym akciyam, vklyuchaya sabotazh i anti-sabotazh, razrushenie i podryv ob®ektov, uklonenie i obhod zakonov, evakuacionnye mery, vedenie podryvnoj deyatel'nosti protiv vrazhdebnyh gosudarstv ili grupp, vklyuchaya okazanie pomoshchi i podderzhki podpol'nomu dvizheniyu soprotivleniya, partizanskim i emigrantskim gruppam osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya; okazaniya podderzhki mestnomu naseleniyu i antikommunisticheskim elementam v stranah svobodnogo mira, kotorym ugrozhaet rasprostranenie kommunizma; razrabotka lyubyh drugih planov i meropriyatij, napravlennyh na dostizhenie postavlennyh celej." PRILOZHENIYA. SOLDAT ROSSII - YURIJ DROZDOV Dushu imej yako voevodu, a telo yako voina, daby voin voevode pokoryalsya, a ne voevoda voinu. Rukopis' IH veka Dorogoj chitatel'! Iz vseh terminov, oboznachayushchih skrytnoe proniknovenie v chuzhie "zakroma" dlya sbora informacii v svoyu pol'zu, samym populyarnym i internacional'nym stalo nemeckoe slovo "shpion". Mne bol'she po dushe (i milee uhu) russkoe slovo "razvedka" - ot slova "vedat'", znat'. Krasivo zvuchit etot termin i na bolgarskom: razuznavane. Razvedka, bezuslovno, sushchestvovala eshche v epohu pervobytno-obshchinnogo stroya i v blizhajshem obozrimom budushchem professiya razvedchika ostanetsya odnoj iz naivazhnejshih. Kniga, kotoruyu vy prochli, - vtoroj, znachitel'no rasshirennyj variant zapisok generala Drozdova. Pervyj vyshel v 1994 godu v izdatel'stve "VlaDar". Dvazhdy avtor zapisok ogovarivaetsya: "Pust' chitatel' menya ne rugaet za nedoskazannost'. Interesy Rodiny prevyshe vsego"... Imenno eto oshchushchenie pronizyvaet vse povestvovanie: dlya avtora prevyshe vsego interesy Rodiny. Gosudarstvennyj deyatel', diplomat, razvedchik - i eshche neskol'ko professij, obladateli kotoryh ezhednevno, a v inyh situaciyah i ezhechasno, dolzhny pomnit' o glavnom - ob interesah Rodiny. Tyazhkaya nosha, zavidnaya sud'ba, pole deyatel'nosti izbrannyh. Lyubye rassuzhdeniya cheloveka "so storony" o tonkostyah raboty razvedchika- nelegala dlya posvyashchennogo za verstu budut otdavat' naivnost'yu - kak by avtor ni naduval shcheki, ne "vzhivalsya v rol'", skol'ko b literatury ni perelopatil, kakoj by fantaziej ni obladal. Neprofessionala (v lyuboj oblasti znanij i deyatel'nosti) vsegda vydaet neznanie professional'nyh melochej, no kol' nelegal'naya razvedka - chast' nashego planetarnogo miroustrojstva, i ot kachestva ee raboty oposredovanno, no ves'ma oshchutimo zavisit sushchestvovanie gosudarstva, to, sta lo byt', hochetsya znat' o nej nemnogo bol'she krome togo, chto ona sushchestvuet. Rasskazat' o nej luchshe, chem byvshij nelegal, nikto i nikogda ne sumeet. Pol' Burzhe govoril, chto "samyj prostoj anekdot iskazhaetsya dazhe v samyh pravdivyh ustah". CHto uzh tut govorit' o razvedke, esli pisat' o nej voz'mutsya postoronnie. Primer tomu - interv'yu YU.I. Drozdova, napechatannoe v zhurnale "Profil'", gde zhurnalistkoj byl stol' izyashchno primenen "tvorcheskij podhod", chto v rezul'tate veteran-razvedchik vyglyadit edakim shchebetunom, kotoromu nakonec-to dozvolili vyskazat'sya, i po hodu besedy - po sekretu vsemu svetu - vydaet gosudarstvennye tajny. Vspomnish' ponevole Mihajlu Lomonosova i slova ego o professore SHlecere! YUrij Ivanovich, vzyavshis' za etot nelegkij trud, opyat'-taki vynuzhden sdelat' ogovorku: "Vsego o rabote razvedki skazat' nikogda nel'zya". Nu, vsego nel'zya, eto ponyatno, no gde zhe ta nezrimaya razreshitel'naya cherta, do kotoroj pripodnyat' zavesu vse zhe hotya by dopustimo? Na raznoj vysote uvideli ee Arkadij SHevchenko ("Razryv s Moskvoj"), Vladimir, Rezun-Suvorov ("Akvarium"), Oleg Kalugin ("Pervoe upravlenie", "Proshchaj, Lubyanka"). Pervye dva - otkrovennye izmenniki Rodiny, tret'ego nazyvayut predatelem byvshie soratniki, no sam on fakt predatel'stva otricaet. General-major SVR (Sluzhby vneshnej razvedki) v otstavke Boris Solomatin priznaet nanesenie ushcherba nacional'noj bezopasnosti Rossii publikaciej poslednej knigi Kalugina i schitaet, chto "napisat' takuyu knigu - eto nikakaya ne smelost', a tochnyj raschet na beznakazannost', na bessilie Rossijskogo gosudarstva zashchitit' svoi interesy". Ponevole zadumaesh'sya nad takoj ocenkoj segodnyashnih vozmozhnostej gosudarstva Rossijskogo!.. V knige YU.I. Drozdova est' glava "Predateli: kazhdyj reshaet sam - byt' im ili ne byt'". Ne sluchajno v nej odna stranica udelena O.Kaluginu. Kak i general Solomatin, general Drozdov opiraetsya lish' na fakty, zakanchivaya glavu ves'ma prozrachnoj frazoj: "Kak eto nazyvat' - otvet'te sami". Kazalos' by, yasno i tak: Kalugin - predatel'. No ni Drozdov, ni Solomatin, ni rukovoditel' press-byuro YU.G.Kobaladze (na pryamoj vopros o Kalugine) takih slov ne vygovarivayut. Navernoe, zdes' imeet mesto byt' ryad prichin: net oficial'nogo prigovora, rol' prokurora ne podhodit vsem troim i, nakonec, priverzhennost' k osoboj terminologii razvedchikov, kogda v delikatnoj forme povestvovaniya mezhdu strok byvaet skazano gorazdo bol'she, chem esli by otvechayushchij na vopros vzyalsya rubit' "pravdu-matku". Nekotorye stranicy zapisok generala Drozdova sleduet chitat', pomyatuya eto pravilo. V avguste 1995 goda, s podachi korrespondenta "Izvestij" v Bonne, zakrutilas' "sobach'ya svad'ba" i vokrug imeni generala Drozdova. "Rossijskij shpion, zaregistrirovannyj pod agenturnym nomerom "D-104" i zaverbovannyj eshche v 1974 godu, po-prezhnemu zanimaet vysokoe polozhenie v nemeckoj razvedke i snabzhaet Moskvu cennymi svedeniyami", - tak zahvatyvayushche nachinalas' stat'ya. Avtor ee, v ugodu sensacii, "chut'-chut'" perefraziroval strochki iz germanskogo zhurnala "Fokus", vyshedshego v svet chetyr'mya dnyami ran'she. Tam znachilos': "Byvshij general KGB YUrij Drozdov priznaet: "Nash cennyj agent v Federal'noj razvedyvatel'noj sluzhbe do sih por ne razoblachen". Raznica sushchestvennaya! Pravda, nemcam tozhe dlya chego-to ponadobilas' sensacionnost': otkryto izdannye memuary byvshego razvedchika oni nazvali "broshyuroj dlya vnutrennego pol'zovaniya". Stoit' zametit', chto opus nemeckogo zhurnalista chitaetsya s bol'shej priznatel'nost'yu k avtoru, chego ne skazhesh' pro "svoih". Verbovka agenta "D-104" - ostroumnejshaya kombinaciya, kotoroj sovetskaya razvedka po pravu mozhet gordit'sya. Na vsyakij sluchaj ya pointeresovalsya u Drozdova: - V BND ne uspokoilis', ishchut "D-104"? - Ishchut. - A vdrug najdut? - |to nevozmozhno. Odnoj iz samyh intriguyushchih glav mozhno schitat', glavu "Agenty vliyaniya i posledstviya razvala SSSR". Ob agentah vliyaniya govoril na zakrytom zasedanii Verhovnogo Soveta SSSR 17 iyunya 1991 goda predsedatel' KGB SSSR V.A. Kryuchkov. Mnogim pamyatna shumiha v demokraticheskoj presse po povodu agentov vliyaniya (etomu terminu neizmenno pridavalos' ironicheskoe zvuchanie!) posle publikacii v "Pravde" (1992 g.) stat'i V.A. Kryuchkova "Posol bedy", gde on, v chastnosti, ob®yavil agentom vliyaniya SSHA A.N. YAkovleva. Vo vremya odnoj iz sluchajnyh vstrech s Vladimirom Aleksandrovichem ya sprosil ego, mozhet li on dokazat', chto YAkovlev - agent vliyaniya SSHA. On otvetil bukval'no sleduyushchee: "Ob etom budet skazano v nuzhnoe vremya i v nuzhnom meste". V "nuzhnoe mesto" (Prokuraturu Rossijskoj Federacii) YU.I. Drozdova i priglasili po delu A.N. YAkovleva. Zabegaya vpered, skazhem, chto pered sledovatelem nepotoplyaemyj akademik ot politiki okazalsya "chist" (to-to bylo vostorgu v sredstvah massovoj informacii), ibo... prinadlezhnost' k agenture vliyaniya fakticheski nedokazuema. Ne utratil on doveriya i u prezidenta. Na pamyat' prihodit kontrastnyj i pokazatel'nyj v istoricheskom smysle dialog mezhdu geroem Otechestvennoj vojny 1812 goda F.I. Glinkoj i imperatorom Nikolaem I: - Gosudar', menya oklevetali! - Glinka, ya znayu, chto ty sovershenno chist, no tebe nadobno okonchatel'no ochistit'sya. Agent vliyaniya (termin priduman v nedrah CRU, a vovse ne "krasno- korichnevymi") - eto chelovek, ispoveduyushchij cennosti i ideologiyu protivnoj storony i nasazhdayushchij ee u sebya doma vsemi vozmozhnymi sposobami, rabotaet ne za den'gi, a za ideyu. Vprochem, pooshchrit' ego dlya bolee krepkoj privyazki est' desyatki vozmozhnostej: vsyakogo roda premii, prisvoenie mezhdunarodnyh zvanij, priglashenie k uchastiyu v prestizhnyh mezhdunarodnyh seminarah i simpoziumah, izdanie knig za rubezhom i moshchnaya ih reklama, zauryadnaya lest' - v tom chisle i "sil'nyh mira cego"... Gosudarstvennyj deyatel' vysokogo poleta i ogromnogo vliyaniya mozhet byt' agentom vliyaniya chuzhoj strany kak soznatel'no, tak i sam togo ne podozrevaya, vosprinimaya darovannye emu zhiznennye blaga i pochesti ne kak "podkormku" chuzhih specsluzhb, a kak mezhdunarodnoe priznanie svoej velichiny ili genial'nosti. "Pochesti menyayut nravy, odnako redko - v luchshuyu storonu", - pisal eshche Plutarh 18 stoletij tomu nazad. Na upomyanutom zakrytom zasedanii Verhovnogo Soveta SSSR V. A. Kryuchkov zachital dokument s grifom "Osoboj vazhnosti", adresovannyj CK KPSS 24 yanvarya 1977 goda, "O planah CRU po priobreteniyu agentury vliyaniya sredi sovetskih grazhdan". On nevelik, i procitirovat' chast' ego ya schitayu nuzhnym, chtoby dopolnit' povestvovanie YU.I. Drozdova: "Amerikanskaya razvedka stavit zadachu osushchestvlyat' verbovku agentury vliyaniya iz chisla sovetskih grazhdan, provodit' ih obuchenie i v dal'nejshem prodvigat' v sferu upravleniya politikoj, ekonomikoj i naukoj Sovetskogo Soyuza. CRU razrabotalo programmy individual'noj podgotovki agentov vliyaniya, predusmatrivayushchuyu priobretenie imi navykov shpionskoj deyatel'nosti, a takzhe ih koncentrirovannuyu i ideologicheskuyu obrabotku. Krome togo, odnim iz vazhnejshih aspektov podgotovki takoj agentury yavlyaetsya prepodavanie metodov upravleniya v rukovodyashchem zvene narodnogo hozyajstva. Rukovodstvo amerikanskoj razvedki planiruet celenapravlenno i nastojchivo, ne schitayas' s zatratami, vesti poisk lic, sposobnyh po svoim lichnym i delovym kachestvam v perspektive zanyat' administrativnye dolzhnosti v apparate upravleniya i vypolnyat' sformulirovannye protivnikom zadachi. Pri etom CRU ishodit iz togo, chto deyatel'nost' otdel'nyh, ne svyazannyh mezhdu soboj agentov vliyaniya, provodyashchih v zhizn' politiku sabotazha v narodnom hozyajstve i iskrivlenie rukovodyashchih ukazanij, budet koordinirovat'sya i napravlyat'sya iz edinogo centra, sozdannogo v ramkah amerikanskoj razvedki. Po zamyslu CRU, celenapravlennaya deyatel'nost' agentury vliyaniya budet sposobstvovat' sozdaniyu opredelennyh trudnostej vnutripoliticheskogo haraktera v Sovetskom Soyuze, zaderzhit razvitie nashej ekonomiki, napravit nauchnye izyskaniya v Sovetskom Soyuze po tupikovym napravleniyam. Pri vyrabotke ukazannyh planov amerikanskaya razvedka ishodit iz togo, chto vozrastayushchie kontakty Sovetskogo Soyuza s Zapadom sozdayut blagopriyatnye predposylki dlya ih realizacii v sovremennyh usloviyah. Po zayavleniyu amerikanskih razvedchikov, prizvannyh neposredstvenno zanimat'sya rabotoj s takoj agenturoj iz chisla sovetskih grazhdan, osushchestvlyaemaya v nastoyashchee vremya amerikanskimi specsluzhbami programma budet sposobstvovat' kachestvennym izmeneniyam v razlichnyh sferah zhizni nashego obshchestva..." Pozhaluj, dostatochno. S avgusta 1975 po oktyabr' 1979 goda rezidenturoj razvedki v N'yu-Jorke rukovodil YU.I. Drozdov. Datirovka privedennogo dokumenta podskazyvaet, chto on sostavlen na osnove razveddannyh ego "komandy". YA privel doklad V.A. Kryuchkova eshche ddya togo, chtoby chitatel' sopostavil ego osnovnye polozheniya s tekstom ukazannoj glavy iz knigi Drozdova i smog ubedit'sya, chto dal'nejshie sobytiya v SSSR - Rossii razvivalas' po zayavlennomu "scenariyu". V zaklyuchenie V.A. Kryuchkov privel stroki iz amerikanskogo dokumenta "Trebovaniya k razvedke v 90-e gody": "V predstoyashchem desyatiletii tajnye operacii amerikanskih razvedyvatel'nyh organov protiv SSSR budut vazhnym instrumentom vneshnepoliticheskoj deyatel'nosti pravyashchih krugov SSHA". V avguste 1995 goda mne sluchilos' popast' na prosmotr dokumental'nogo fil'ma, snyatogo po etoj knige, i uchastvovat' v ego obsuzhdenii. Iz zala prozvuchal dovol'no strannyj vopros: "YUrij Ivanovich, kak vy schitaete: naskol'ko vasha deyatel'nost' razvedchika sovmestima s ponyatiem nravstvennosti?" Lico Drozdova mgnovenno preobrazilos' - u gub legli dve zhestkie skladki. On otvetil korotko: "|to - vojna!" I dejstvitel'no, chto tut dobavish'?.. |to vojna - tajnaya, gluboko zakonspirirovannaya, nevidimaya dlya postoronnih, no vojna. Pobedy i porazheniya razvedok legko mogut obernut'sya pobedami i porazheniyami gosudarstv. Vspomnim "avgustovskij putch" 1991 goda. Radio "Svoboda" soobshchilo sensacionnye izvestiya: "Uzhe cherez neskol'ko chasov posle togo, kak Gorbacheva blokirovali v Forose, Agentstvo nacional'noj bezopasnosti SSHA vplotnuyu zanyalos' perehvatom razgovorov, kotorye YAzov i Kryuchkov veli iz svoih kabinetov s komanduyushchimi okrugami i prochimi krupnymi voenachal'nikami"; "...amerikanskim razvedorganam bylo porucheno pomoch' El'cinu v ukreplenii ohrany i nalazhivanii svyazi. CHto oni i sdelali." Byvshij direktor ANB (samogo zasekrechennogo razvedyvatel'nogo soobshchestva SSHA) Uil'yam Odom sokrushalsya, chto SSHA prinesli "uzhasnuyu zhertvu" i chto "v budushchem eto kolossal'nyj minus". Reshenie, odnako, prinimal dal'novidnyj politik Dzhordzh Bush - prezident i byvshij direktor CRU. Segodnya uzhe ochevidno, chto spasenie El'cina dlya SSHA znachilo gorazdo bol'she, chem nekotoraya utechka sekretnosti. Dal'nejshij razval strany, nasil'stvennaya amerikanizaciya Rossii ("my reshili, chto luchshe vsego uchit'sya u SSHA, gde demokratiya sushchestvuet na protyazhenii dvuhsot let"), sdacha pozicij na mezhdunarodnoj arene i t.d. - yarchajshee tomu podtverzhdenie. Izvestno, chto v noyabre 1961 goda prezident SSHA Dzh.Kennedi dal sankciyu na provedenie sekretnoj podryvnoj operacii protiv Kuby, naznachiv kuratorom svoego brata Roberta. Byvshij razvedchik, a zatem nachal'nik analiticheskogo otdela KGB, Nikolaj Sergeevich Leonov v odnom iz interv'yu opisyvaet mehanizm povorota sobytij v nuzhnoe ruslo, kogda dejstviya specsluzhb perehodyat v moshchnoe i umeloe davlenie gosudarstva. Rech' idet o neugodnom SSHA pravitel'stve Sal'vadora Al'ende. "Amerikancy organizovali bojkot chilijskoj medi, ot prodazhi kotoroj CHili poluchala osnovnye valyutnye postupleniya. Oni zamorozili v bankah chilijskie scheta. Mestnye predprinimateli stali perekachivat' svoj kapital za granicu, svertyvat' rabochie mesta na predpriyatiyah, sozdavat' iskusstvennuyu nehvatku prodovol'stviya v strane. Podobnyj nazhim primenyalsya i v drugih stranah, kogda eto bylo neobhodimo SSHA. YA pomnyu, tak bylo v Paname pri Nor'ege i v drugih stranah." V sovetskoe vremya rasskazyvali anekdot - v meru smeshnoj, v meru patriotichnyj (vo nashi dayut!): Florida, mys Kanaveral. Gotovitsya zapusk supersekretnogo sputnika. Mesto zapuska okruzheno trojnym kol'com ohrany. Krugom - ni zhivogo sushchestva, tol'ko na vershine suhogo dereva sidyat dve vorony. "Vzletit", - govorit odna vorona. "Ne vzletit!" - otvechaet drugaya. "Vzletit...". "Ne vzletit!". Raketa podnimaetsya v vozduh - vzryv, letyat na zemlyu oskolki. "Nakarkala" - dovol'no bormochet pervaya vorona. "Sluzhu Sovetskomu Soyuzu!" - otvechaet vtoraya. Kakuyu zhe razvedku mozhno schitat' samoj sil'noj v mire? YU. I. Drozdov v svoej knige ob etom ne pishet. Upominaet, pravda, ob odnom amerikanskom kontrrazvedchike, v kabinete kotorogo ryadom s portretom |. Guvera visel portret YU.V. Andropova, kak "rukovoditelya sil'nejshej razvedki v mire". Byvshij nelegal Vadim Martynov, kotorogo sdal vmeste s zhenoj i det'mi predatel' Gordievskij, rassuzhdaet tak: "CRU v professional'noj srede ne ochen' kotiruetsya. Ih mozhno obmanut', esli vydumat' chto-to novoe, inogda mozhno perekupit', pojmat' na chem-nibud'. Tradicionno ser'eznym protivnikom vsegda byla britanskaya MI-6. CRU predlagalo mne stat' ih konsul'tantom po razvedke! Anglichane nikogda by ne sdelali takoj oshibki. Tajnaya sluzhba Izrailya "Mossad" - pozhaluj, samaya sil'naya razvedka mira. Ona opiraetsya na patrioticheskie i religioznye chuvstva evrejskih obshchin, razbrosannyh po vsemu miru i imeyushchih vliyanie v samyh vysokopostavlennyh krugah. U nee est' ogromnye den'gi i nachisto otsutstvuet kakoj-libo kodeks chesti i uvazheniya k zakonu". V samom dele, "Mossad" - kak govoritsya, osob stat'ya v "druzhnoj sem'e" razvedok mira: ona sozdana v 1937 godu - zadolgo do obrazovaniya gosudarstva Izrail'. Podobnyh primerov istoriya ne znaet. Vozmozhno, pravil'nee skazat' - evrejskaya razvedka sozdala evrejskoe gosudarstvo? Leon YUris, avtor knigi "|ksodus", podcherkivaet (ch.I, gl.8): "U evreev bylo eshche to preimushchestvo, chto lyuboj evrej v lyuboj strane mira byl potencial'nym istochnikom informacii i podderzhki dlya agenta Mossad Aliya Bet". Segodnya uzhe nel'zya ne schitat'sya s islamskimi razvedchikaii, specsluzhbami transnacional'nyh korporacij i mezhdunarodnyh bankov. V knige odna iz glav nazyvaetsya "Nuzhnaya rabota". Dlya teh, kogo soderzhanie glavy ne ubedilo v nuzhnosti raboty razvedchika, privedu lish' odin primer. Za dva mesyaca do nachala Kurskoj bitvy nasha aviaciya nanesla seriyu bombovyh udarov po semnadcati aerodromam fashistov i unichtozhila 500 nemeckih samoletov. Celi byli vybrany s uchetom poluchennoj informacii ot nashego agenta Dzhona Kernkrossa Predstav'te teper', chto eti samolety "horosho porabotali" v Kurskoj myasorubke... V epohu "perestrojki" i "vseobshchej demokratizacii" obyvatelya pokupali na takie primitivnye deklaracii, vrode "nam nikto ne ugrozhal, a SSSR sam byl ugrozoj mirovoj stabil'nosti", "my vsegda zhili za "zheleznym zanavesom" i nam ne hvatalo otkrytosti" - i t. p. Kogda ya slyshu slovo "otkrytost'", mne pochemu-to vspominaetsya fraza iz "Zapisnoj knizhki" A. P. CHehova: "Pochemu ty ne daesh' mne chitat' pis'ma svoej zheny, ved' my zhe s toboj rodstvenniki!" Vot kak, naprimer, poteshayutsya nad nashej "otkrytost'yu" anglichane (gazeta 'Gardian", maj 1992 g.) "Po proshestvii pyati let posle raspada Sovetskogo Soyuza odin fakt ostaetsya ochevidnym: u zapadnyh razvedyvatel'nyh sluzhb poyavilas' shirokaya vozmozhnost' dlya verbovki informatorov v nekogda moshchnom rossijskom VPK. Dva goda nazad rossijskaya Federal'naya sluzhba kontrrazvedki zayavila, chto vyyavila v 1994 godu bol'she shpionov, chem za predydushchie 5 - 7 let. Kak