F.C. 594 (C.A.), at pp. 606-07, and Hoang v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), supra. Deportation may, however, come within the scope of a "treatment" in s. 12. The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1990) defines treatment as "a process or manner of behaving towards or dealing with a person or thing ...." It is unnecessary, for the purposes of this appeal, to decide this point since I am of the view that the deportation authorized by ss. 27(1)(d)(ii) and 32(2) is not cruel and unusual. The general standard for determining an infringement of s. 12 was set out by Lamer J., as he then was, in the following passage in R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, at p. 1072: The criterion which must be applied in order to determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual within the meaning of s. 12 of the Charter is, to use the words of Laskin C.J. in Miller and Cockriell, supra, at p. 668, "whether the punishment prescribed is so excessive as to outrage standards of decency". In other words, though the state may impose punishment, the effect of that punishment must not be grossly disproportionate to what would have been appropriate. The deportation of a permanent resident who has deliberately violated an essential condition of his or her being permitted to remain in Canada by committing a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment of five years or more, cannot be said to outrage standards of decency. On the contrary it would tend to outrage such standards if individuals granted conditional entry into Canada were permitted, without consequence, to violate those conditions deliberately. (c) Section 15 Although the constitutional question stated by Gonthier J. raises the issue of whether ss. 27(1)(d)(ii) and 32(2) violate s. 15 of the Charter, the respondent made no submissions on this issue. I agree, for the reasons given by Pratte J.A. in the Federal Court of Appeal, that there is no violation of s. 15. As I have already observed, s. 6 of the Charter specifically provides for differential treatment of citizens and permanent residents in this regard. While permanent residents are given various mobility rights in s. 6(2), only citizens are accorded the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada in s. 6(1). There is therefore no discrimination contrary to s. 15 in a deportation scheme that applies to permanent residents, but not to citizens. 2 Do ss. 82.1 and 83 of the Immigration Act, 1976 or Reliance on the Certificate Authorized by s. 83, infringe s. 7 of the Charter? Two separate sets of questions were stated on the main appeal -- firstly, whether ss. 82.1 and 83 themselves infringe s. 7 and if so whether they can be saved under s. 1, and secondly whether reliance on the certificate authorized by s. 83 infringes s. 7 in a manner that cannot be saved under s. 1. I agree with the submissions of both parties that the question of whether ss. 82.1 and 83 violate s. 7 was properly before the Federal Court of Appeal and should have been answered. It can therefore be addressed by this Court on appeal from the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal. The section 7 violation raised in both questions involves the operation of a certificate issued under s. 83 of the Act to deprive the respondent of an appeal under s. 72(1)(b) of the Act. These questions raise two issues -- first, whether the substantive provisions violate s. 7 and secondly, whether the procedure followed by the Review Committee results in a s. 7 violation. I will deal with these issues in that order. The practical significance of ss. 82.1 and 83 of the Act stems from their interaction with the rights of appeal from a s. 32(2) deportation order provided by s. 72(1) of the Act. Section 72(1)(a) provides for a true appeal, based on any question of law or fact or mixed law and fact. Under s. 72(1)(b), Parliament has granted a further appeal on the ground that "having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the person should not be removed from Canada". This latter ground of appeal grants the Immigration Appeal Board discretion to quash a deportation order notwithstanding the fact that the individual falls within one of the categories in s. 27(1) such that the deportation order was properly made under s. 32(2). It thus allows for clemency from deportation on compassionate grounds. Section 82.1 sets out the conditions which may give rise to an investigation by the Review Committee and the procedure to be followed in such an investigation. In general terms the Solicitor General and the Minister of Employment and Immigration may make a report to the Review Committee in respect of a permanent resident who has launched an appeal pursuant to s. 72(1)(b) where they are of the opinion, based on security or criminal intelligence reports, that that person is likely to engage in organized crime, espionage, acts of violence that might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada, or subversion by force of any government. In the case of the respondent the joint report was based on s. 19(1)(d)(ii): 19. (1) . . . (d) persons who there are reasonable grounds to believe will . . . (ii) engage in activity that is part of a pattern of criminal activity planned and organized by a number of persons acting in concert in furtherance of the commission of any offence that may be punishable under any Act of Parliament by way of indictment; When the Review Committee receives such a joint report, it must conduct an investigation into the grounds on which it is based and report to the Governor in Council. Where, after considering the report of the Review Committee, the Governor in Council is satisfied that the person does fall within one of the categories in s. 82.1(2) (the categories pursuant to which the Ministers can make a joint report to the Review Committee), he or she may direct the issuance of a certificate under s. 83. The effect of this certificate is to direct the Immigration Appeal Board to dismiss any appeal made pursuant to s. 72(1)(b). In other words, the individual's appeal will be limited to questions of fact or law or mixed fact or law. Substantive Ground The respondent submits that the impugned legislation is inconsistent with s. 7 of the Charter because it creates a process whereby he is deprived, contrary to the principles of fundamental justice, of his right to appeal against deportation on the ground set out in s. 72(1)(b). The necessary implication of this position is that it is a principle of fundamental justice that a permanent resident who is the subject of deportation proceedings be afforded an appeal on all of the circumstances of the case. Otherwise it cannot be a violation of principles of fundamental justice for Parliament to limit the availability of such an appeal. In my view s. 7 does not mandate the provision of a compassionate appeal from a decision which, as I have already concluded, comports with principles of fundamental justice. Before a deportation order can be issued against a permanent resident, an inquiry must be conducted by an adjudicator to determine whether the permanent resident does fall into one of the classes in s. 27(1). Section 72(1)(a) provides for an appeal from such a deportation order on any question of law or fact or mixed law and fact. The decision of the Board is subject to appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal on a question of law if leave is granted by that Court (s. 84 of the Act (now s. 83)). These rights of appeal offer ample protection to an individual from an erroneous decision by the adjudicator. The question is whether principles of fundamental justice require more than this. In order to answer this question it is necessary to consider the "nature, source, rationale and essential role" of the right to appeal from deportation orders under the Act and the evolution of that right: Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, supra. The Immigration Act, S.C. 1910, c. 27, did not provide any specific grounds of appeal. A person ordered deported could only resort to the Minister who, under s. 19, had the authority to overturn a deportation order on unspecified grounds. The Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 325, provided for an immigration appeal board; however, appeals against deportation orders remained under the control of the Minister. The appeal board heard only those appeals directed to it by the Minister and the Minister retained the power to confirm or quash the appeal board's decision or substitute his decision as he deemed just and proper. The 1966 White Paper on Immigration criticized the broad overriding power of the Minister with respect to appeals, and recommended that a reconstituted Immigration Appeal Board have authority to deal conclusively with appeals against deportation orders except in "security cases". In 1967, the Immigration Appeal Board Act, S.C. 1966-67, c. 90, established an independent Immigration Appeal Board. Section 11 provided for appeals on any questions of law or fact or mixed law and fact. Section 15, for the first time, conferred upon the Board the power to stay or quash a deportation order made against a permanent resident on the basis of all the circumstances of the case. However s. 21 provided that that new power was still subject to the discretion of the Minister and the Solicitor General who could certify their opinion, based on security or criminal intelligence reports, that it would be contrary to the national interest to permit such relief. In Prata v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, supra, Martland J. stated at p. 381: The effect of s. 21 is to reserve to the Crown, notwithstanding the powers conferred upon the Board by the Act, the right, similar to the prerogative right which existed at common law, to determine that the continued presence in Canada of an alien, subject to a deportation order, would not be conducive to the public good. The Immigration Appeal Board Act was repealed by the Immigration Act, 1976, s. 128. Section 72 of the Immigration Act, 1976 effectively consolidated ss. 11 and 15 of the former Immigration Appeal Board Act into one section setting out two separate grounds of appeal. However in my view it did not change the nature of the decision that could be made by the Board "having regard to all the circumstances of the case". That decision remained, as it had been under the 1967 Act, an exercise of discretion based on compassionate grounds. Section 83 of the Immigration Act, 1976 continued to limit the availability of relief based on all the circumstances of the case. Such an appeal had to be dismissed if the Minister and the Solicitor General certified their opinion that, based on security or criminal intelligence reports, it would be contrary to the national interest to permit it. Finally in 1984 the Security Intelligence Review Committee was established by the CSIS Act. The Review Committee was assigned various functions under several Acts, including the Immigration Act, 1976. Section 83 was repealed and s. 82.1 and an amended version of s. 83 were substituted. Section 82.1 assigned to the Review Committee the task of investigating and reporting to the Governor in Council as to whether a permanent resident came within the classes of persons not entitled to an appeal on all the circumstances of the case. However, the decision as to whether to direct the issuance of a certificate under s. 83 is that of the Governor in Council. It can thus be seen that there has never been a universally available right of appeal from a deportation order on "all the circumstances of the case". Such an appeal has historically been a purely discretionary matter. Although it has been added as a statutory ground of appeal, the executive has always retained the power to prevent an appeal from being allowed on that ground in cases involving serious security interests. If any right of appeal from the deportation order in s. 32(2) is necessary in order to comply with principles of fundamental justice, a "true" appeal which enables the decision of the first instance to be questioned on factual and legal grounds clearly satisfies such a requirement. The absence of an appeal on wider grounds than those on which the initial decision was based does not violate s. 7. Procedural Ground The respondent submitted that his s. 7 rights were violated as a result of the procedure followed by the Review Committee. This argument was the basis for the judgment of the majority in the Court of Appeal. I have already concluded that the respondent can assert no substantive right to an appeal on compassionate grounds. It is entirely within the discretion of Parliament whether an appeal on this basis is provided. Accordingly, Parliament could have simply provided that a certificate could issue without any hearing. Does the fact that Parliament has legislated beyond its constitutional requirement to provide that a hearing will be held enable the respondent to complain that the hearing does not comport with the dictates of fundamental justice? It could be argued that the provision of a hearing ex gratia does not expand Parliament's constitutional obligations. I need not resolve this issue in this case because I have concluded that, assuming that proceedings before the Review Committee were subject to the principles of fundamental justice, those principles were observed. These proceedings took place within the framework of several legislative provisions and Review Committee Rules. Section 82.1(3) of the Immigration Act, 1976 provides that in an investigation by the Review Committee pursuant to a joint report by the Solicitor General and the Minister of Employment and Immigration, ss. 43, 44 and 48 to 51 of the CSIS Act apply, subject to certain specific modifications and with such other modifications as the circumstances require. Section 48(2) of the CSIS Act provides that no one is entitled as of right to be present during, to have access to or to comment on representations made to the Review Committee by any other person. Pursuant to s. 39(1) of the Act, the Review Committee adopted the "Rules of Procedure of the Security Intelligence Review Committee in Relation to its Function Under Paragraph 38(c) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act". Rules 45 to 51 set out the procedure relating to the making of representations under s. 48(2) of the CSIS Act. A party to an oral hearing may be represented by counsel, may call and examine witnesses and may make representations (Rule 48(1)). It is within the Committee's discretion to exclude from the hearing one or more parties during the giving of evidence or making of representations by another party (Rule 48(3)). It is also within the Committee's discretion, in balancing the requirements of preventing threats to the security of Canada and providing fairness to the person affected, to determine whether a party is entitled to cross-examine witnesses called by other parties (Rule 48(2)) and whether, if a party has been excluded from portions of the hearing, the substance of the evidence given or the representations made by the other party should be disclosed to that party (Rule 48(4)). The scope of principles of fundamental justice will vary with the context and the interests at stake. In R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, La Forest J., writing for the majority, stated at p. 361: It is clear that, at a minimum, the requirements of fundamental justice embrace the requirements of procedural fairness (see, e.g., the comments to this effect of Wilson J. in Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, at pp. 212-23). It is also clear that the requirements of fundamental justice are not immutable; rather, they vary according to the context in which they are invoked. Thus, certain procedural protections might be constitutionally mandated in one context but not in another. Similarly, the rules of natural justice and the concept of procedural fairness, which may inform principles of fundamental justice in a particular context, are not fixed standards. See: Syndicat des employés de production du Québec et de l'Acadie v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 879, at pp. 895-96; Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653, at p. 682. In Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, La Forest J. explained at p. 539 that in assessing whether a procedure accords with fundamental justice, it may be necessary to balance competing interests of the state and the individual: What these practices have sought to achieve is a just accommodation between the interests of the individual and those of the state, both of which factors play a part in assessing whether a particular law violates the principles of fundamental justice; see R. v. Lyons, [[1987] 2 S.C.R. 309], at pp. 327 and 329; R. v. Beare, [[1988] 2 S.C.R. 387], at pp. 403-5; also my reasons in R. v. Corbett, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, at p. 745 (dissenting on another point); see also R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, at p. 304, per La Forest J. (Dickson C.J. and Lamer J. concurring). The interests in the area with which we are here concerned involve particularly delicate balancing. . . . In the context of hearings conducted by the Review Committee pursuant to a joint report, an individual has an interest in a fair procedure since the Committee's investigation may result in its recommending to the Governor in Council that a s. 83 certificate issue, removing an appeal on compassionate grounds. However, the state also has a considerable interest in effectively conducting national security and criminal intelligence investigations and in protecting police sources. The need for confidentiality in national security cases was emphasized by Lord Denning in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hosenball, [1977] 3 All E.R. 452 (C.A.), at p. 460: The information supplied to the Home Secretary by the Security Service is, and must be, highly confidential. The public interest in the security of the realm is so great that the sources of information must not be disclosed, nor should the nature of the information itself be disclosed, if there is any risk that it would lead to the sources being discovered. The reason is because, in this very secretive field, our enemies might try to eliminate the source of information. On the general need to protect the confidentiality of police sources, particularly in the context of drug-related cases: see R. v. Scott, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 979, at pp. 994-95. See also Ross v. Kent Inst. (1987), 57 C.R. (3d) 79, at pp. 85-88 (B.C.C.A.), in which that court held that it is not essential in order to comply with principles of fundamental justice that an inmate know the sources of information before the Parole Board as long as he is informed of the substance of that information. The CSIS Act and Review Committee Rules recognize the competing individual and state interests and attempt to find a reasonable balance between them. The Rules expressly direct that the Committee's discretion be exercised with regard to this balancing of interests. In this case the respondent was first provided with the "Statement of Circumstances giving rise to the making of a Report by the Solicitor General of Canada and the Minister of Employment and Immigration to the Security Intelligence Review Committee". This document set out the nature of the information received by the Review Committee from the Ministers, including that the respondent had been involved in drug trafficking, and was involved in the murder of a named individual. Also prior to the Review Committee hearing, the respondent was provided with an extensive summary of surveillance of his activities (the "Chronology of Information") and a "Summary of Interpretation of Intercepted Private Communications relating to the murder of Domenic Racco". Although the first day of the hearing was conducted in camera, the respondent was provided with a summary of the evidence presented. In my view, these various documents gave the respondent sufficient information to know the substance of the allegations against him, and to be able to respond. It is not necessary, in order to comply with fundamental justice in this context, that the respondent also be given details of the criminal intelligence investigation techniques or police sources used to acquire that information. The respondent was also given the opportunity to respond, by calling his own witnesses or by requesting that he be allowed to cross-examine the RCMP witnesses who testified in camera. The Chairman of the Review Committee clearly indicated an intention to allow such cross-examination: Certainly, it would be my inclination that if the RCMP wish to call witnesses in support of any or all of the comments that they may make in support of the Statement of Circumstances, there would be the opportunity for the applicant's counsel to cross-examine. The respondent chose not to exercise these options. Having regard to the information that was disclosed to the respondent, the procedural opportunities that were available to him, and the competing interests at play in this area, I conclude that the procedure followed by the Review Committee in this case did not violate principles of fundamental justice. VI. Conclusion I would therefore allow the appeal, dismiss the cross-appeal, both with costs, and answer the constitutional questions as follows: Main Appeal 1 (a) Do sections 82.1 and 83 of the Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, as amended by S.C. 1984, c. 21, s. 84 (now ss. 81 and 82 of the Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-2) infringe or deny the rights guaranteed by s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? Answer:Assuming without deciding that s. 7 applies, the answer is no. (b) If the sections referred to above do infringe or deny the rights guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter, are they justified by s. 1 of the Charter? Answer:This question does not have to be answered. 2 (a) Does reliance upon the certificate authorized by s. 83 of the Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, as amended by S.C. 1984, c. 21, s. 84 (now s. 82 of the Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-2) filed in the respondent's case result in an infringement of his rights pursuant to s. 7 of the Charter, because the process followed by the Security Intelligence Review Committee did not meet the requirements of s. 7? Answer: Assuming without deciding that s. 7 applies, the answer is no. (b) If reliance upon the certificate does infringe or deny the rights guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter, is it justified by s. 1 of the Charter? Answer:This question does not have to be answered. Cross-Appeal 1 (a) Do s. 27(1)(d)(ii) and s. 32(2) of the Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, as amended by S.C. 1984, c. 21, s. 84 (now s. 27(1)(d)(ii) and s. 32(2) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-2) infringe or deny the rights guaranteed by ss. 7, 12 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in that they require the deportation of persons convicted of an offence carrying a maximum punishment of five years or more, without reference to the circumstances of the offence or the offender? Answer:With respect to s. 15, the answer is no. Assuming, without deciding, that either s. 7 or s. 12 apply, the answer is no. (b) If the paragraph and subsection referred to above do infringe or deny the rights guaranteed by ss. 7, 12 and 15 of the Charter, are they justified by s. 1 of the Charter? Answer:This question does not have to be answered. Appeal allowed and cross-appeal dismissed. With respect to the main appeal, assuming without deciding that s. 7 is applicable, ss. 82.1 and 83 of the Immigration Act, 1976, do not infringe or deny the rights guaranteed by s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and reliance upon the certificate authorized by s. 83 of the Immigration Act, 1976, did not result in an infringement of s. 7 having regard to the process followed by the Security Intelligence Review Committee. With respect to the cross-appeal, the requirement that persons convicted of an offence carrying a maximum punishment of five years or more be deported, without reference to the circumstances of the offence or the offender, does not offend s. 15, or ss. 7 or 12 assuming without deciding that these sections applied. Solicitor for the appellant: John C. Tait, Ottawa. Solicitor for the respondent: Irwin Koziebrocki, Toronto. Solicitors for the intervener: Noël, Berthiaume, Aubry, Hull. The official versions of decisions and reasons for decision by the Supreme Court of Canada are published in the Supreme Court Reports (S.C.R.). This site is prepared and published by LexUM in partnership with Supreme Court of Canada. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE PROTECTION ACT INTRODUCED OTTAWA, February 21, 2001 -- Elinor Caplan, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, today tabled the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in the House of Commons, reaffirming her commitment to be tough on criminals while strengthening efforts to attract skilled immigrants. The new bill incorporates a number of recent proposals from Canadians, yet maintains the core principles and provisions of Bill C-31, the immigration legislation introduced prior to last fall's general election. The Minister said the legislation reintroduces severe penalties -- fines of up to $1 million and life in prison -- for people smugglers and traffickers, speeds up family reunification, and maintains Canada's humanitarian tradition of providing safe haven to people in need of protection. "By saying 'No' more quickly to people who would abuse our rules, we are able to say 'Yes' more often to the immigrants and refugees Canada will need to grow and prosper in the years ahead," said Minister Caplan. The bill reintroduces key measures to strengthen the integrity of the refugee determination system. These include front-end security screening for all claimants, clearer grounds for detention, fewer appeals and opportunities for judicial review to delay the removal of serious criminals, and suspension of refugee claims for people charged with serious crimes until the courts have rendered a decision. The legislation reaffirms the commitment to faster but fair decisions on refugee claims by consolidating several current steps and criteria into a single protection decision to be made by the Immigration and Refugee Board, and by combining the increased use of single-member panels with an internal paper appeal before the Board. In addition, the new bill reintroduces a number of key provisions designed to expand the admission of workers with the skills that are most acutely needed in Canada. The key changes that have emerged from discussions of Bill C-31 and that were introduced today include: The inclusion of the definition of permanent resident in the Act; Provisions within the bill that reinforce the government's commitment to gender equality and clarify that parents are members of the family class; An oral appeal hearing for people facing a loss of permanent resident status for failure to maintain residency; Improved safeguards for people in need of protection: unsuccessful repeat refugee claimants will be eligible for a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) if they return to Canada after six months (as opposed to one year); discretion for oral PRRA in exceptional circumstances; protected people whose identities have been established will be eligible to apply for Canadian refugee travel documents; The requirement of a warrant to arrest refugees and permanent residents for any immigration matter. The principle that children will be detained only as a last resort. The Minister promised supporting regulations over the coming months, which will include a strengthened overseas refugee resettlement program, an expanded family class, new selection criteria to attract more highly skilled and adaptable independent immigrants, and the creation of an "in-Canada" landing class for temporary workers, foreign students and spouses already established in Canada and wishing to stay. The expanded family class will increase the age at which a dependent child can be sponsored from under 19 to under 22 and allow spouses and children to apply for permanent residence from within Canada. The Minister also expressed willingness to pursue discussions with the provinces over additional ways to expand the family class. The new legislation will replace the current Immigration Act, which was first passed in 1976 and which has been amended more than 30 times. Work on the new legislation began in 1997 and has evolved through extensive consultations with the provinces, the territories, the legal community, non-governmental organizations and the general public. - 30 - For Information: Derik Hodgson Press Secretary Minister's Office (613) 954-1064 René Mercier Media Relations Communications Branch (613) 941-7042 Backgrounder # 1 Changes from Bill C-31 In response to Bill C-31, the government received submissions from the Canadian Bar Association, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Canadian Council for Refugees and many others. The Minister has listened and responded. Framework Legislation What we heard: The government should ensure that all key principles and core policies are reflected in the Act and not in the regulations. The regulations should be limited to matters related to the implementation of policy. Our response: 1.The new bill places greater emphasis on key principles, including: The principles of equality and freedom from discrimination. The principle that minor children should be detained only as a last resort. The principle of equality of status for both official languages. 2.The new bill also includes the following provisions previously intended to be prescribed by regulation: The provision that parents are members of the family class. The provision that sponsored spouses, partners and dependent children of immigrants and refugees and their dependents will not be refused admission to Canada on the grounds that they would create an excessive demand on the medical system. 3.The new bill also reinforces the government's commitment to gender equality and provisions for opposite- and same-sex couples. Provisions Affecting Permanent Residents What we heard: Permanent residents should have a separate, defined status that clearly specifies their rights and obligations, including the right to enter Canada. Loss of status determinations should be made only through an oral appeal to the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB). Our response: The new bill enhances the rights of permanent residents by: Including a separate definition for permanent residents that highlights the distinction between permanent residents and other foreign nationals. Ensuring the right to an oral hearing before the IRB in the case of appeals on the loss of permanent resident status. Ensuring facilitated entry for permanent residents without a valid permanent resident card if they have been outside Canada for less than one year. Setting a higher threshold for examinations for permanent residents than for other foreign nationals. Requiring a warrant to arrest a permanent resident for any immigration matter. Access to the Refugee Determination System What we heard: Access to the refugee determination system is too restrictive and would deny access to people convicted of politically trumped-up charges. Others who are excluded from the IRB procedures may be denied access to a fair risk assessment upon return to their country of origin. Our response: The possibility of politically trumped-up charges will be considered by the IRB, except in cases where the Minister finds the person to be a danger to the public. The new bill clarifies that unsuccessful refugee claimants, refugees who have withdrawn or abandoned their claims, and refugees excluded from the IRB process will have access to a pre-removal risk assessment prior to removal. The risk review may provide for an oral hearing, depending on the complexity of the case. Repeat claimants will have access to the risk review after six months instead of one year. People refused resettlement overseas will have access to the IRB determination system should they later apply from within Canada. Other Amendments to Respond to Stakeholder Submissions The time limit for filing leave for judicial review of overseas decisions is prolonged from 15 to 60 days. Convention refugees and protected people whose identities have been established will be provided with a document indicating their status and making them eligible to apply for refugee travel documents. - 30 - 2001-03 Backgrounder # 2 Making the System Work Better For Immigrants Improving Client Service What we are doing: Piloting new approaches to overseas processing. Introducing new technology: the Global Case Management System. Why we are doing it: To ensure faster processing, quality decisions and increased transparency. Clearing up Backlogs and Managing the Inventory What we are doing: Designating new funds to clear up backlogs. Improving the management of the inventory of applications for permanent residence and for immigration visas abroad. Introducing the Multi-year Planning Process. Why we are doing it: To serve Canadians, permanent residents and potential immigrants faster and more effectively. To enable the program to move toward immigration levels of one percent of the population. Expanding the Family Class What we are doing: Broadening the definition of "dependent child" by increasing the age from under 19 to under 22. Opening up adoption provisions in keeping with the principle of the best interests of the child. Modernizing the definition of "family" to include common-law and same-sex partners. Why we are doing it: To reflect the high value Canadians place on the family. To maintain and enhance the family class as an important component of the overall program. To reflect the changing nature of social relationships in Canada. Facilitating Family Reunification What we are doing: Creating an in-Canada landing class for sponsored spouses and partners for both immigrants and refugees. Exempting sponsored spouses, partners and dependent children from the admission bar with regard to excessive demand on health or social services. Reducing the age at which Canadian citizens and permanent residents are eligible to sponsor from 19 to 18. Including "parent" in the definition of family class within the Act. Reducing the length of the sponsorship requirement from 10 years to 3 years for spouses and common-law opposite- and same-sex partners. Why we are doing it: To make it easier for families to be reunited as soon as possible. Incorporating the Best Interests of the Child What we are doing: Incorporating the principle of the best interests of the child in appropriate provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Why we are doing it: To uphold our international commitments as a signatory to three United Nations conventions on the rights of the child. To reflect the high value Canadians place on the well-being of children. Modernizing the Selection System: Skilled Workers What we are doing: Moving away from an occupation-based model to one focused on flexible and transferable skills. Assigning more weight to education. Increasing the relative weight of having knowledge of an official language but ensuring that language is not a bar to admission. Creating an "in-Canada landing class" for temporary workers (including recent graduates from Canadian schools) who have a permanent job offer and who have been working in Canada. Why we are doing it: To attract and keep the highly skilled, adaptable immigrants that Canada needs to succeed and prosper in the future. Expanding the Temporary Worker Program What we are doing: Facilitating the entry of temporary workers through a more serviceoriented approach. Pursuing agreements with individual sectors or firms to identify and meet short-term labour market needs, while respecting the terms of applicable federal-provincial agreements. Why we are doing it: To allow the immediate needs of employers to be met faster. To expand our access to the global labour market. To attract people who are skilled and on the move and to encourage them to make Canada their destination of choice. Strengthening Sponsorship Obligations What we are doing: People in default of court-ordered spousal or child support payments will not be allowed to sponsor. People convicted of a crime related to domestic abuse will not be able to sponsor unless a pardon has been granted or rehabilitation has been demonstrated. New legislative provisions will improve the ability of the federal government to recover the costs of social assistance in cases of sponsorship default. People receiving social assistance, except for reasons of disability, will not be able to sponsor. Why we are doing it: To strengthen the integrity of the sponsorship program. Streamlining Appeals What we are doing: Introducing a new leave requirement for people appealing visa officer decisions from overseas. Developing an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for overseas decisions. Limiting inland humanitarian and compassionate applications to one per year. Why we are doing it: To provide a screening mechanism for applications to the Federal Court for review of overseas decisions. The leave provision currently exists fo